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ABSTRACT
During the Cold War, the United States focused its collective policy acumen on forming
a competitive, actor-specific strategy to gain advantage over the Soviet Union. The
fragmentation of the Soviet Union resulted in a multi-polar geopolitical environment lacking a
near-peer rival for the United States. Overwhelming soft and hard power advantages allowed
American policy makers to peruse a general, non-actor specific strategy to maintain its
hegemonic position. However, the meteoric rise of China as a near-peer competitor in East Asia
has challenged this paradigm. In order to maintain its competitive advantage, or at the very least
ensure the safety of its geopolitical objectives through encouraging benign competition, U.S.
strategy needs to evolve in both focus and complexity. It is essential for Spacepower, as a key
element of national power, to be included in this evolution. In order to do so, this analysis will
examine Sino-U.S. space relations using neoclassical realism as a baseline methodology. First,
structural elements of the Sino-U.S. relationship will be modeled in a semi-quantitative game
theoretical framework, using relative economic and military capabilities as primary independent
variables. Second, key assumptions will be tested to ensure that this model accurately represents
the current geopolitical environment. Third, the decision making apparatuses of the United States
and China will be examined as intervening variables. This will account for imperfect rationality
and how it modifies the game theoretical framework. Fourth, this framework will be used to
present actionable space policy recommendations for the United States so that space can be
incorporated into a competitive strategy for East Asia.

xi

I.

Background

A. RESEARCH QUESTION
The rise of China as an economic and military force threatens to upset the status quo of
American hegemony in East Asia. Although hard power conflict is not a predetermined aspect of
Sino-U.S. relations, structural factors favor a contentious outcome in the long-term. Therefore,
the United States must adopt an actor-specific competitive strategy for East Asia that leverages
all elements of latent national power to pursue consistent, well-defined national objectives.
Spacepower is an important but often overlooked element of national power that plays a unique
role in Sino-U.S. relations. Consequently, the focus of this thesis will be how Spacepower may
be integrated into a broader competitive strategy for East Asia with the goal of producing policy
recommendations for U.S. space policy.

B. RELEVANCE TO U.S. POLICY
On June 17, 2011, four notable academics convened in Toronto to debate the following
question: will the 21st century belong to China? Niall Ferguson, internationally renowned author
of history and biography, was accompanied by David Li to argue for the pro. Li is an economics
professor and member of the Monetary Policy Advisory Committee of the Central Bank of
China. Debating for the con were Fareed Zakaria, notable journalist and author, as well as Henry
Kissinger. Kissinger has become a de facto authority on Sino-U.S. relations following his tenure
as secretary of state under Richard Nixon. 1 The premise of their debate would have been far-

1

Rudyard Griffiths and Patrick Luciani, Does the 21st Century Belong to China? (Toronto: House of Anansi
Press, 2011), 3-7.

1

fetched at the end of the Cold War; however, in the quarter century since, this question has
become paramount to the world’s collective geostrategic planning. The collapse of the Soviet
Union left the United States as the unquestionable global hegemon at the end of the Cold War.
However, the subsequent rise of regionally influential actors has resulted in an increasingly
multipolar geopolitical environment. 2 The existential threat that the U.S. faced during the Cold
War has been replaced by a conglomeration of emerging actors vying for an increasing role in
their region, with the precipitous economic development of China and its increasing influence in
East Asia heralding this trend. Although this debate was cordial and well informed, it
demonstrated the substantial uncertainty that China’s rise has created in global politics. The
message was clear: there is no clear path forward for the U.S. to accommodate China’s rising
ambitions.
During the Cold War, the United States executed a well-designed and competitive strategy
for counterbalancing the Soviet Union in the wake of World War II. 3 The success of this strategy
can be attributed to the following principles:
1. Think in the long term. Futurist elements must be integrated into a competitive strategy to
account for emerging technologies and trends. 4 Medium to long term analysis reduces the
chance that a revolution in military affairs (RMA) will catch a state by surprise, allows
for a cost-benefit analysis of allocating resources to a current problem or a more pressing

2

Griffiths and Luciani, 62.
Graham Allison. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (Boston: HoughtonMifflin-Harcourt, 2017), 204.
4
Thomas Mahnken, Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2012), 100.
3

2

one that is anticipated in the future, and allows for consistency in the face of a dynamic
political environment.
2. Ways, ends, and means must be synergistic. 5 Individual technologies, tactics, and policies
should be measured by the effects they produce towards broader strategic goals.
Likewise, an understanding of broader strategic goals must be considered when
developing policy for a focused area (such as space). 6 Ultimately, the goal of a
competitive strategy should be a sustainable status quo congruent with the country’s
interests.
3. Know thy enemy. Competitors get a vote, therefore a deep understanding of their decision
making apparatus is required to gauge a move/response/counter-response pattern. 7
Diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and social factors must be understood in
the context of strategic culture in order to accomplish predictive analysis. 8 Forming this
understanding may be the greatest barrier that the United States faces in developing an
actor-specific competitive strategy. 9
4. Resource constraints are inevitable. Allocation of resources (such as money, political
will, time, and existing capabilities) is often the deciding factor in the success of a
strategy. Inevitably, tradeoffs will need to be made in a way that utilizes a state’s
strengths to take advantage of a competitor’s weaknesses. 10 Conducting a systematic

5

Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific (Annapolis: Naval Institute
Press, 2014), 128.
6
Thomas Drohan, A New Strategy for Complex Warfare: Combined Effects in East Asia (Amherst: Cambria
Press, 2016), 12-15.
7
Mahnken, Competitive Strategy, 95.
8
Drohan, A New Strategy for Complex Warfare, 8-9.
9
Mahnken, Competitive Strategy, 24.
10
Haddick, Fire on the Water, 122.
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analysis of individual strengths and weaknesses is required to implement this aspect of
strategy and prevent overreach.
Space policy and national strategy were closely linked during the Cold War, combining soft
and hard power initiatives in service of clearly defined objectives. 11 President Kennedy’s moon
program was extremely effective in accomplishing its goals because it accounted for every
element of combined strategy. The president, despite his rhetoric, did not believe in the intrinsic
value of space travel; rather, he understood that it could be a powerful symbol of America’s
technological and cultural superiority over the Soviet Union. Kennedy saw the Apollo program
as an opportunity to win an ideological battle for the hearts and minds of the third world by
presenting a strong image of progressive anti-colonialism. 12 It was aimed at exploiting the
structural weaknesses in the Soviet system while simultaneously leveraging the productivity of
the American technocracy. 13 Most importantly, Kennedy, Johnson, and Webb exercised
considerable political acumen to overcome limitations within the American system in order to
mobilize the requisite national resources to execute their desired strategy. 14
In the years since the Cold War, the United States has largely failed to integrate space policy
and national strategy. American politicians have tended to focus on replicating Kennedy’s grand
vision of space travel and mirroring his nationalist rhetoric to score political victories rather than
focusing on the mechanics of competitive strategy. President Bush’s Space Exploration Initiative
and the 2004 Bush space vision fell hopelessly short of stated goals while American strategists

11

Joan Johnson-Freese. Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 51-81.
Walter McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1985), 303-306.
13
McDougall, 307-324
14
John Logsdon, John F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 119142, 235-237.
12
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became increasingly myopic, concentrating on the tactical military utility of space systems at the
expense of other aspects of national power. 15 The counterproductivity of the U.S. space policy
can be exemplified with three post-Cold War initiatives: withdrawing from the ABM treaty,
export control legislation, and space dominance doctrine. 16
American strategic planners during the Cold War had the luxury of operating in a bipolar
environment where multi-order effects could ultimately be accounted for in the context of the
U.S.-Soviet balance of power. However, with an increasingly complex geopolitical environment
in which China is emerging as the United States’ primary competitor and the rest of the world is
developing parity with American technological capabilities, U.S. strategy must become more
economical. It is of vital importance that the core tenants of competitive strategy be applied to
the development of a similarly effective strategy in East Asia. 17. This must be accomplished
while avoiding the common pitfall of fighting the previous war. 18 The space domain is a
microcosm of the broader strategic picture, one that is becoming increasingly complex, with
more states fielding space capabilities, rapid technological advancements, the rising importance
of space as an element of national power, and the meteoric rise of China. Therefore, it is
necessary to reexamine space policy in order to integrate it with a competitive strategy for East
Asia.

15

Thor Hogan, Mars Wars: The Rise and Fall of the Space Exploration Initiative (Washington: NASA History
Division, 2007), 159-166.
16
Johnson-Freese outlines the failures of American space policy since the Cold War in Space as a Strategic
Asset. These specific programs will be examined at length during subsequent chapters.
17
Allison, Destined for War, 214-240; Mahnken, Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century, 101-103; Drohan,
A New Strategy for Complex Warfare, 4-5, 272, 275-278; Haddick, Fire on the Water, 121-138; Henry Kissinger,
On China (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 534-542.
18
Mahnken, Competitive Strategy, 15.
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C. METHODOLOGY
Neoclassical realism is the best theoretical approach to perform the medium-term predictive
analysis that competitive strategies require. It acknowledges that structural factors such as
relative power and geography are the chief independent variables of international relations in the
long-term, ultimately setting the left and right bounds of state behavior. 19 This theory suggests
that foreign policy is strongly linked to systemic incentives but asserts that those incentives are
not deterministic. 20 Therefore, it accounts for the general trend of conflict that occurs when the
global status quo is usurped, while avoiding the propensity for structural determinism inherent to
offensive realism. Neoclassical realism emphasizes that building an understanding of structural
factors is required as the first step to analyzing international relations, therefore the overarching
method through which competitive strategy must be developed is by examining external,
systemic variables impacting Sino-U.S. relations. This thesis will examine the unique geography
of East Asia, the physics of the space domain, and the relative power dynamic between China
and the United States as its primary independent variables.
One of the core tenants of neoclassical realism is the assumption of imperfect rationality. A
leader’s understanding of structural factors is inevitably refracted as it passes through the lens of
cultural perception and behavioral economics, and often functions in combination with a lack of
information about an opponent’s intentions and capabilities. These influences create
misperceptions about the relative power dynamic, causing leaders to make seemingly irrational
decisions. As a result, structural factors can only impact states’ behavior to the extent that they

19
20

Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Thories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 151.
Rose, 164.
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influence the perception and decision making of leaders. This complicates the linear correlation
between structural factors and state behavior, making a purely realist analysis less accurate over
the short and medium terms. 21 Therefore, neoclassical realism requires that a state’s decision
making apparatus must be considered as an intervening variable to account for these factors. 22
Internal factors must be studied in conjunction with external factors to be able to perform a
comprehensive analysis of state behavior. In order to determine the effects of these intervening
variables, this thesis will examine the decision making apparatuses of China and the United
States through an examination of unmotivated and motivated biases that affect the Sino-U.S.
strategic relationship.
For foreign policy analysis, a neoclassical realist approach seeks to avoid both a heavily
quantitative game theoretical analysis or the purely qualitative methods of thick description. 23 A
balance must be struck between the tendencies for game theoretical analysis to devolve into
structural determinism, or for thick description to become mired in overly-nuanced analysis. A
non-quantitative, descriptive game theoretical analysis is able to strike this balance. On one hand,
purely quantitative game theoretical framework used for predictive analysis succumbs to
exponentially increasing complexity as a greater range of intervening variables is introduced. On
the other, a simple 2x2 game is often dismissed as being too simplistic to capture the complexity
of international politics. 24 Therefore, a game should be used as a representation of general policy

21

Rose, 158.
Rose, 152.
23
Rose, 166.
24
Duncan Snidal, “The Game Theory of International Politics,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 44.
22
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stances, one that can be modified to encompass a wide range of phenomena in order to illuminate
the fundamental nature of a policy issue. 25
The foundation of this analysis will be a basic 2x2 game that seeks to describe the structural
dynamic of Sino-U.S. relations. Independent variables such as relative military capability and
economic means will be used to set a reference point for each player, assign utility within the
function, and establish equilibrium. The game will be then be modified using intervening
variables, such as motivated and unmotivated biases, in order to anticipate deviations from
perfect rationality. This method is based off Robert Jervis’s seminal article Cooperation Under
the Security Dilemma, in which he sets the theoretical groundwork for integrating game theory,
neoclassical realism, and the security dilemma. 26 This analysis will build on Jervis’s framework
by incorporating actor and domain specific information.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW
The best fit for a literature review when using a neoclassical realist methodology is a topdown approach as it requires a solid appreciation of structural incentives before applying them to
the analysis of a given scenario. Therefore, developing a conceptual understanding of the
mechanisms of international conflict and how they are modified to account for psychological
factors is foundational to this thesis. In order to apply this understanding to Sino-U.S. space
policy the structural variables affecting Sino-U.S. space policy must be examined. These
includes the geography of the space domain, establishing deterrence in space, its use as an
instrument of national power, and the broader Sino-U.S. geostrategic balance. Subsequently,

25
26

Snidal, 37.
Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978).
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assessing intervening psychological variables is based on attaining an understanding of Chinese
and American security cultures, the perceptions of policy makers about the space and its role in
strategy, and domestic variables that impact decision making. Finally, integrating space policy
into the thesis schema requires both a review of existing literature on competitive strategy for
East Asia and a review of each nations’ space capabilities and policies in an attempt to link the
two. This will include an analysis of how space capabilities fit into current strategy, how they
interact with psychological factors, and conclude with a near-term predictive analysis of
technology and policy development.
In his 1978 publication Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, Robert Jervis provides an
excellent analysis of structural and cognitive factors influencing the security dilemma in
international relations. His fundamental assumption is that international relations exist in a
condition of anarchy where a state is responsible for its own security absent an international
sovereign. 27 This results in zero-sum relationships where a state’s quest for security impedes the
security of another. Therefore, when a state seeks to expand its influence in order to increase its
own security it upsets the existing status quo, making another state less safe. 28 He uses a game
theoretical framework to broadly explain the choices that both states can make, cooperate or
defect. Both states can defect and the result is conflict; both states can cooperate and reap gains;
or one can cooperate while the other defects, which results in one state losing big and the other
winning big. The fear of this third condition is the causal force behind the security dilemma. 29

27

Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 167.
Jervis, 169-170.
29
Jervis, 172.
28
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Jervis expands the theory by adding the offense-defense postulate which examines the
circumstances under which the security dilemma is most strong. When technology and
geography conspire to give an advantage to an attacker, first strikes are incentivized and the
dilemma becomes stronger. 30 Additionally, the security dilemma is heightened when offense is
not distinguishable from defense because signaling is inherently ambiguous. When both of these
conditions are met, it creates a doubly dangerous scenario where it is difficult to gain security
without menacing others. When the opposite condition is true, signaling is effective and a zerosum relationship is not exaggerated. This results in a doubly stable relationship with a
diminished propensity towards the security dilemma. Even when defense has the advantage a
security dilemma can result when offensive and defensive postures are indistinguishable because
intentions are difficult to predict. 31
The usefulness of Jervis’s work to this analysis would be limited if he had only accounted for
structural factors. However, in “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma” Jervis briefly
acknowledges imperfect rationality through the concept of subjective security demands. He
purports that if every world leader rationally understood her nation’s alignment with this theory,
conflict would be obsolete. Therefore, the structural mechanism of the security dilemma is
dependent on the psychology and perception of national leaders, which alters their calculus of
the security dilemma. 32 Jervis expands this idea in a topical anthology titled Psychology and
Deterrence. These two works, when taken together, form the basis of a neoclassical realist’s
analysis of the security dilemma. Case studies involving deterrence failure are used to discern the

30

Jervis, 194.
Jervis, 211-214.
32
Jervis., 174-176.
31
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factors responsible for the underlying miscalculations. 33 Three hypothesis are of particular
interest to this thesis. First, the misperception of the offense-defense balance prior to World War
I (WWI) contributed to a lack of first-strike stability. Second, culture differences resulting in bad
signaling were a factor leading to the Falklands War. Third, a miscalculation of an unacceptable
shift in balance of power created an incentive to launch a preemptive attack preceding the ArabIsraeli War of 1973. 34
The integration of structural and psychological factors in decision making under the security
dilemma is accomplished through the application of behavioral economics. Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky set the basis for this understanding in their collected works, the capstone of
which is Thinking Fast and Slow. Cognitive predispositions, the availability heuristic, and
motivated biases are all used to explain deterrence failures in Psychology and Deterrence. 35
However, the most relevant of their works is Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk. It explains that the linear correlation between risk and gains in a rational model can be
modified to account for the propensity of an actor to accept risk based on her satisfaction with
the status quo. The result is a non-linear relationship between risk and gains. Their model is often
used to account for psychological variables within a game theoretical framework. 36 Kahneman
and Tversky propose that actors have the tendency to assess their position in relative rather than
absolute terms, therefore those who are dissatisfied with their relative position are increasingly

33

Robert Jervis, Richard Nebow, and Janice Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1991), 11.
34
Jack Snyder covers the first case in his chapter “Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914”, Richard
Lebow examines the origins of the Falklands War in “Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the
Falklands War”, and Janice Stein looks into the third case in the chapter “Calculation, Miscalculation, and
Conventional Deterrence: The View From Cairo”
35
Jervis, Nebow, and Stein, 18-27.
36
Bonnie Triezenberg, Deterring Space War: An Exploratory Analysis Incorporating Prospect Theory into a
Game Theoretic Model of Space Warfare (Santa Monica: RAND, 2017), 35-37.
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likely to accept risk while those who are satisfied become risk averse. 37 This dynamic is
expected to be especially strong between China and the United States where the U.S. represents a
strong status quo power and China is emerging to challenge America’s position. Assessing
internal variables for China and the United States can set a reference point for each nation and,
using prospect theory, perform an analysis of their propensity to accept risk.
After examining models of international conflict and incorporating them within a theoretical
framework in order to set the foundation for this thesis methodology, structural dynamics
underlying the Sino-U.S. space policy relationship must be examined. Because context is
essential to any niche policy arena, the broader Sino-U.S. geostrategic balance is the primary
structural dynamic affecting Sino-U.S. space policy. In Destined for War: Can America and
China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Grahm Allison coins the term Thucydides’s Trap to describe
the friction caused by a state gaining comparative military, political, and economic power at the
expense of an existing hegemon. He uses Thucydides examination of this dynamic in History of
the Peloponnesian War as the basis of his research and examines 15 additional case studies in
which a rising power has displaced a status quo power. 38 By Allison’s own admission the use of
words like destined or predetermined are misleading. However, he reveals that, “…in all cases
we find heads of state confronting strategic dilemmas about rivals under conditions of
uncertainty and chronic stress,” 39 and in 12 of 16 cases examined the result has been war

37

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,”
Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979): 277.
38
Graham Allison, Destined for War, 41-44.
39
Allison, 43. Allison means “chronic stress” in terms of a cyclic relationship between geopolitical uncertainties
and domestic upheaval, which puts pressure on a state’s decision making apparatus. It describes a position where a
head of state is experiencing political pressure to either maintain relative geopolitical prestige for their state in the
face of a challenge from another OR exert newly acquired diplomatic, economic, and/or military power on the world
stage.
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between the two states. 40 Additional to the zero-sum hard power relationship strongly acting
upon both actors to strengthen the security dilemma, Allison proposes that psychological factors
can modify the relationship and serve to either dampen or exacerbate Thucydides’s Trap.
Generally, a rising power’s recognized status in the international community lags behind that
state’s self-perceived importance whereas the status quo power faces fear and anxiety in the face
of potential decline. 41 Management of these perceptions is essential to avoiding conflict.
Allison makes the case that the contemporary Sino-U.S. relationship meets the conditions for
Thucydides’s trap and analogizes it with the pre-WWI dynamic between Britain and Germany.
He argues that the rapid expansion (or reemergence) of China’s economy is supporting a
subsequent increase in military power and political influence in East Asia. This threatens to upset
the status quo of American hegemony in the region. 42 Allison examines China’s national
motivations and internal decision making apparatus and proposes that the Chinese Communist
Party’s (CCP) mandate is to return Chinese national prestige and recoup national sovereignty.
This is supported primarily by a strong nationalist sentiment and continued economic reform. 43
The analysis is useful in that it examines the structural preconditions for conflict, but also
conducts a layered neoclassical realist analysis by identifying accompanying psychological
factors and suggesting a way forward to help soften the structural predilection for conflict. These
actor-specific recommendations may be integrated into a competitive strategy approach to
increase its efficacy.
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Robert Haddick’s Fire on the Water is relevant to this thesis in that it combines an
understanding of East Asian geography, the current state of military technology and doctrine,
and national motivations to perform a holistic analysis of the Sino-U.S. strategic balance.
Although China has substantial coastline, it is viewed as a continental power rather than a
maritime one due to the cramped nature of the South China and East China Seas. A series of
island chains create a physical barrier that serves to constrain Chinese naval expansion and offers
the opportunity for hostile nations to stage attacks into mainland China. China’s traditional fear
of encirclement, its quest for resources, and unresolved national sovereignty creates incentives
for maritime expansion. 44 On the other hand, fear of China’s expanding influence among nations
along China’s periphery has resulted in rebalancing in order to contain China. Furthermore,
China’s expanded influence threatens U.S. interest in the region, creating the potential to limit
access to sea lines of communication and coerce trading partners. This creates a struggle where
China must demonstrate the capability to deny U.S. military assets access to the area close to
China’s maritime borders while the U.S. seeks to maintain the ability to project power into the
region and strike at Chinese strategic interests.
This dynamic has two important implications for this thesis. Due to the emphasis on systems
warfare and information systems, the current overall military balance lacks first-strike stability.
Also, the cost of offensive capabilities is far lower than the capabilities they are designed to
defeat. American surface ships and 5th generation air assets are orders of magnitude more
expensive and harder to produce than the Chinese anti-access missiles designed to interdict them.
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Haddick’s assessment of an offensive dominant condition is bleak considering Jervis’s
observations about how an environment that favors the offense heightens the security dilemma.
More importantly, the tyranny of distance has created an overreliance on space assets in East
Asian military operations. It is clear to see through Haddick’s analysis that space operations and
terrestrial geography are interrelated. He paints a bleak picture where, in the event of hostilities,
the area within 2000km of the Chinese mainland would turn into a dead zone where the cost of
performing military operations is prohibitive aside from limited probing actions. 45 The United
States will likely be deprived of traditional land, sea, and air assets used for performing ISR used
for targeting mainland China, which greatly reduces the coercive capability of the U.S. military.
The resulting reliance on space assets to perform these functions increases their value as military
targets. Likewise, China uses space-based capabilities for targeting U.S. military assets between
the Chinese mainland and the second island chain. Aided by their continental position, China’s
space and ground based ISR assets create a redundant architecture with which to threaten U.S.
assets. 46 This creates an asymmetric advantage for China that makes space warfare a possible
tool of coercion and deterrence. However, for the Chinese, as the theater of operation’s distance
from the mainland increases their reliance on space assets is proportionally raised. Therefore,
projecting power beyond the first island chain becomes a difficult proposition without space
power. Due to the importance of space assets in the East Asian military balance this thesis argues
that they will likely be considered as first-strike options by both nations.
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In addition to the links between terrestrial geography and space power, space has a unique
geography in and of itself. Said geography, defined by orbital mechanics and the relentless pull
of gravity, must be examined as a fundamental structural component of this analysis. Often times
policy makers fail to grasp that realities of orbital mechanics and current state of technology
create a very limited right and left bound of what is possible (or at the very least practical) in
space. Everett Dolman, author of Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, argues
that space, counterintuitively, is an operationally limited environment. Due to the exponential
cost that the rocket equation imposes on lifting objects into orbit, spacefaring nations develop
narrow, well-trodden pathways to space in an attempt to minimize this cost. 47 Launch locations
and support stations at given latitudes and longitudes are more valuable than others. 48 Also, an
orbit’s characteristics translate to their relative path along the earth’s surface. Therefore, only
certain combinations of orbital elements produce an orbit that serves a purpose for terrestrial
support functions. These limiting factors create strategic chokepoints through which the entirety
of the space domain may be controlled. 49
Dolman uses his assessment of space geography to apply the geopolitical realist lines of
thinking from Mackinder and Mahan’s to the space domain. It is arguable that his Realpolitik
thought experiment has had disproportional influence on space strategists, but a useful line of
thought still comes out of Dolman’s analysis. It is evident that space domination is possible
given a state with adequate technological prowess and the will to do so. Rather than the cosmos
being an impossibly large area out of reach of a single hegemon, a state could physically
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dominate space by controlling the most important chokepoints. These chokepoints may serve as
flash points for future conflicts because of space’s overall importance to terrestrial conflict. 50
The entire structure of the space law framework set about in the Cold War was not benign, rather
it was an attempt by Russia and the United States to prevent the domination of space by the other
power considering their own inability to do so. 51 Therefore, with the technological advancements
since the Cold War and the removal of the primary buffer against U.S. expansion, the prospect of
the U.S. seeking space domination seems more likely. This effectively extends the “border”
between the Chinese and Americans and adds another dimension to the already complex
relationship. This thesis will argue that the geography of space combined with the American
doctrine of space control exacerbates the Chinese fear of encirclement.
In Heavenly Ambitions: America’s Quest to Dominate Space, Joan Johnson-Freese argues
that, despite the impressions of policy makers in both China and the U.S., domination of space is
currently impractical due to the current technological development of space systems.
Ideologically, her soft-power driven, innerpolitik analysis of space policy is a counterpoint to
Dolman. This has won her a similar number of disciples in the space policy realm. Three
arguments in particular, which are consistent and well developed through her collected works,
contribute to understanding the structural elements of space policy. First, she believes that
domination of space is inherently threatening. A space hegemon, unlike one in land, air, or sea
would inherently have the capability to violate any nations sovereignty with little posturing, at a
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moment’s notice. 52 This would require the placement of space weapons to interdict all objects
passing through space and be omnipresent in scope and duration. 53
Second, space is an offensive dominant domain. The cost of developing, launching, and
maintaining a space asset that provides a terrestrial effect is far greater than the corresponding
technology that can defeat it. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) technologies to include on-orbit interdictors,
terrestrial based missiles, and electronic jammers are simple, cheap, and efficient, making them
accessible to nations less capable than top-tier space powers. 54 Also, the development time of
space technologies is far slower than their counter. It is possible to shield on-orbit assets with
maneuver capability, shielding, or escorts. However, these assets drastically increase the cost of
maintaining a given effect in a hostile environment. When taken in concert, it is clear from
Dolman and Freese’s work that space hegemony will take a concerted national effort, requiring
an expenditure of time, political capital, and money. Also, the window of time between setting
out to achieve dominance and actually achieving it would be exceptionally vulnerable to a
security dilemma. Even after achieving dominance a hegemon would need to maintain the
capability to render an opponent’s ASAT technologies useless, a capability which also falls prey
to the unfavorable cost relationship of an offensive dominant domain. 55
Third, in the space domain offensive technologies are difficult to distinguish from defensive
ones. The capabilities that make a good weapon are not mutually exclusive with those that have
scientific or commercial uses. 56 Very few red flag capabilities exist that give an adversary
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certainty as to the purpose of a given platform. This results in the necessity to either judge an
adversary by its potential capabilities or take it at face value to be benign. It also results in a
delicate situation where technology diffusion between commercial entities of one country and the
commercial or military organization of another has national security implications. 57 Even worse,
the exact same satellite may be used for civilian or military purposes, sometimes at the same
exact time. 58 This complicates the legitimacy of civilian assets as military targets, a line of
thought reminiscent of the strategic bombing campaigns during WWII. Also, escalation could
occur if third party assets are being used by one of the belligerents. Therefore, it is evident
through Freese’s arguments that space is susceptible to Jervis’s doubly dangerous scenario where
technologies are both offensive dominant and offensive-defense indistinguishable.
Continuing the thread of integrating theories of international conflict to the space domain,
Forrest Morgan applies the principles of deterrence to space in his RAND monograph
Deterrence and First Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment. Morgan’s work
operates on the theoretical level, using traditional cost imposition/denial of gains structure in
support of a broad analysis. Generally, the point where perceived cost of executing a strategy
outweighs the gains reaped from said strategy, deterrence is established. He heavily caveats the
work, calling it an empty template for further research. Due to deterrence’s subjective nature the
deterrent effect of a strategy may be strong on one actor but useless for another. 59 This
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foundational analysis can be applied to Sino-U.S. space policy if the relative development of the
U.S. and China’s space capabilities and strategic culture are accounted for.
Morgan points out that the nature of space deterrence has fundamentally changed since the
end of the Cold War. First, a decoupling of space and nuclear warfare has destroyed the tacit red
lines that guaranteed an attack on space systems would result in nuclear retaliation. 60
Furthermore, technologies have been developed that allow for incremental escalation and nonlethal functional kills of space assets. 61 A paradigm is created where escalation is probable, but
the extent to which it will happen is unknown. This is a problem for Sino-U.S. space relations
because China is a nuclear capable power who believes itself to have achieved nuclear deterrence
with the United States, yet does not have the implied strategic understanding that it took the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. four decades to build. The rules of the game have changed, but the danger of
nuclear apocalypse is still real and a risk of miscalculation has increased.
Morgan echoes Johnson-Freese’s assertion that the dual-use phenomenon complicates
deterrence and extends the reasoning on offensive dominance by adding valuable insight on the
state of first-strike stability. In short, first-strike stability is difficult to maintain because the
disproportionate gain from a first strike outweighs any cost a recipient can impose in response.
The United States’ overwhelming reliance on and comparative advantage from space based
effects gives a prospective attacker very high payoff and satellites being relatively soft targets
increases the likelihood of success and further adds to the benefit of a first-strike. 62 Conversely,
the emphasis on system based warfare means that an effective attack on space assets drastically
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reduces the ability of the U.S. to impose costs. Also, its overreliance on space and the fragility of
the space environment require an asymmetric response to both avoid a tit-for-tat spiral and
protect the continued use of the domain. Furthermore, a lack of space situational awareness
(SSA) prevents a rapid response. 63 Chinese military planners are acutely aware of the
asymmetric advantage to be gained from a first-strike in space and have integrated it into
military doctrine. This further strengthens the argument of space warfare as a flash point in East
Asia.
The structural factors examined in the literature thus far paint a bleak picture for a peaceful
restructuring of East Asia. However, a bipartisan grand strategy that preempts conflict, is
sustained and refined over decades, and has an acute sense of both a competitor and one’s own
culture and history may be able to subvert structural determinism. 64 When imperfect rationality
and miscalculation results in deterrence failure it is difficult to underestimate the importance of
understanding a competitor’s decision making apparatus. Strategic culture, political climate, and
soft power interactions are the core of this apparatus. Joan Johnson-Freese, who is equal parts
East Asia policy and space policy expert, asserts that, “it might be generally possible to grasp the
mechanics of the Chinese space program without the benefits of historical information, but the
likelihood of truly understanding the policy aspects without this contextual information is
slightly less, and attempts at analysis and extrapolation become superficial at best.” 65 Likewise,
competitive strategy will be ineffective absent an understanding of one’s own limitations.
Resources such as latent military capacity, budget, political capitol, strategic culture, and soft
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power/international prestige should be easy to calculate, but many times within the space
program’s short history the failure to grasp internal limitations has been a stumbling block.
Henry Kissinger’s On China is a nuanced examination of Chinese strategic culture that
benefits from the author’s understanding of Chinese history and the nation’s role in late20th/early-21st century global power politics. He conveys a unified message through On China,
that continual diplomatic engagement between the two powers is the key to peace and develops
two motifs throughout the work. First, misapprehension of Chinese intent by western powers has
repeatedly resulted in conflict, which could be avoided with better understanding of Chinese
strategic culture. Traditional Chinese strategic culture, shaped for millennia by geography and
Confucian principals, was not destroyed by Mao and the communist revolution as many assert.
Kissinger uses the traditional martial games of wei qi (go) and chess to exemplify Chinese and
western strategic cultures respectively. Where wei qi teaches the art of strategic flexibility by
emphasizing encirclement, protracted and asymmetric warfare, generating unperceptively small
advantages, and momentum; chess teaches total victory achieved by attrition, decisive moves,
centers of gravity, and symmetry. Carl von Clausewitz teaches that war is policy by other means,
inferring war as a distinct phase of politics; while Sun Tsu emphasizes victory before fighting by
achieving psychological advantage with military means as a small part of overall strategy. The
ideal Chinese military conflict is geographically limited and easily contained; the American way
of war concludes only upon total victory. 66
Kissinger then describes the feedback loop that results from conflicting strategic
perspectives. The western desire for control threatens Chinese freedom of maneuver and
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exacerbates their siege mentality. In response, China assumes a policy of active defense
(preemption) in order to maintain the strategic initiative. This, in turn, is seen as hostile by the
west and typically results in escalation in order to establish deterrence through cost imposition.
The western idea of deterrence is incompatible with ambiguity and flexibility while Chinese
preemption demands it. 67 This results in a distinguishable pattern. First, a state consolidates
power on China’s periphery, surrounding China and threatening its structural integrity on both
physical and psychological levels. Second, ever aware of shi, Chinese strategists employ
measures to maintain their strategic flexibility and prevent total encirclement. Third, the
peripheral power misinterprets preemption for aggression and escalates the conflict. At this
point, China is either able to contain the threat and achieve its geopolitical aims or it is too weak
to do so and is thrown into existential crisis. In the 20th century, this pattern has been
exemplified by Chinese involvement in the Korean War and its continued support of an
independent state to buffer the U.S. alliance bloc from a historical ingress point to the Chinese
mainland; its own Vietnam War to prevent the emergence of a competitive power bloc led by
Vietnam in Southeast Asia; and Chinese political maneuvering against the Soviet Union to
prevent its consolidation of power over the Eurasian landmass. Disregarding the similarities
between these disputes and the current Sino-U.S. position in East Asia is impossible. 68
Second, the Sino-centric worldview is rising in China as she emerges from a century of
humiliation to become an economic and military superpower. The over-proselytized American
belief that the implementation of democracy should be the end goal of global politics and
unapologetically moralist positions conflict with Sino-centrism. It is seen by China as an
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extension of colonial interventionism and a threat to their fiercely held autonomy. U.S.
diplomacy is often contingent on the improvement of China’s human rights record. Widespread
support for China’s various separatist movements and public outcry over the Tiananmen Square
incident has exacerbated this problem. American reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of a
communist government, give up democratization as long term policy goals, or give China its due
in international relations has weakened Sino-U.S. relations. America’s moralist rather than
pragmatic approach to policy threatens China’s delicate social order and undermines CCP
legitimacy, resulting in missed diplomatic opportunities.
Other policy analysts are certainly influenced by Kissinger, but add their own insight into
Chinese Strategic culture. Kenneth Johnson and Andrew Scobell writing for the Strategic Studies
Institute both attribute the apparent cognitive dissonance in Chinese policy to a curious blend of
Confucian ideals and realpolitik thought, supporting Kissinger’s assertion that Confucianism is
not dead. There is a cult of defense within China, accompanying a deeply held belief that China’s
strategic culture is overwhelmingly pacifist. 69 However, preemptive action is permissible as long
as it can be a justifiable “defense” of Chinese strategic interests. 70 In addition, China bemoans
aggressive territorial expansion and hegemony by force. This historical sensitivity has only been
exacerbated by the “century of humiliation” at the hands of European powers. 71 However, the
benevolent expansion of influence and the use of force for Chinese national unification is just.
Furthermore, the Chinese fear of encirclement could cause a disproportionate reaction to the U.S.
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force realignment and restructuring of alliances in East Asia. 72 This could exacerbate the
worsening of the security dilemma that alliance forming typically causes.
Joan-Johnson Freese emphasizes the influence of Confucianism in internal decision making
and the penchant for isolationism. Confucianism emphasizes peace, order, and knowing one’s
place within society. This invites authoritarianism and the Chinese people have little experience
with participation in the political process. Rather, there is an instability lurking beneath the calm
surface of society that leaders must constrain and satisfy in order to maintain their mandate to
rule. 73 The social contract has a simple results based nature where political stability and
prosperity is exchanged for the continued political power. The Chinese Communist Party then is
less beholden to communist ideology than it is to continued prosperity. 74 Also, despite the
negative connotation of nepotism in the West, it is an institution of Chinese culture (known as
Guan Xi). 75 From the outsider, the familial ties, importance of relationships,
compartmentalization, and ambiguity in the Chinese bureaucracy are confusing and frustrating.
This research paints the picture of the U.S. and China as diametrically opposed cultures
that are almost designed to create misunderstanding between the two. Therefore, being aware of
cultural and political sensitives is necessary to create sound strategy. Michael Pillsbury identifies
16 psycho-cultural pressure points where, if correctly considered in reassurance, cost imposition,
or dissuasion strategies, will yield disproportionately effects whether they be positive or
negative. Each of these factors are referred to as “fears”. 76 Eleven of the sixteen fears are linked
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to the ability of the U.S. military to project power into East Asia and the strategic sea lines of
communication from the Strait of Malacca to the Bohai Gulf, which is contingent on the ability
to deliver space effects in support of U.S. military operation. Pillsbury identifies the fear of
attack on their anti-satellite capabilities as a specific Chinese fear, but warfighting in the space
domain is intrinsically linked to the other 11. Another of the sixteen fears is the fear of escalation
and loss of control. This is particularly important because the Chinese view ASAT weaponry as a
legitimate cost imposition option designed to limit conflict. Contrast that with the American
strategy of threatening escalation in order to prevent the spread of the conflict into space and
implicit red lines that fail to account for limited conflict in a strategic domain. Space’s role in
soft power links it to two final fears, the fear of regional competitors and the fear of internal
instability. Space technology development is essential to the CCP’s techno-nationalist narrative
as it is assigned great importance internally to strengthen CCP’s mandate to rule and externally
to legitimize China as a regional leader.
According to Sun Tzu, “if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the
result of a hundred battles.” 77 While studying a competitor’s strategic culture is useful to avoid
mirroring; understanding one’s own strategic culture is vital to effectively utilizing national
resources and avoiding bias. 78 This thesis benefits from being able to perform a thick analysis of
American strategic culture using a panoply of English language sources. Russell Howard
describes American strategic culture as that of a traditional sea power with moralistic overtones.
The American military is highly constrained by legal and moral considerations, meaning that in
order for the U.S. to enter a war there must be an existential threat to its national security or a
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crusade of good versus evil. 79 This results in national mobilization so that the U.S. can “bear the
burden of a long twilight struggle against the common enemies of man,” to borrow from John F
Kennedy’s inaugural address. 80 America’s history is punctuated with these struggles from the
Civil War to WWII. This ideology has become more prominent since the Vietnam War, which
entrenched the view that, “when America uses force in the world, the cause must be just, the goal
must be clear, and the victory must be overwhelming.” 81 Max Boot in his three books provides
excellent analysis of how the global wars of the 20th century, the rise of technology, and casualty
aversion has impacted American strategic thought in the 21st century. 82
American space power doctrine has shown itself to be a microcosm of its strategic culture
rather than an exception to it. In his influential work, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political
History of the Space Age, Walter McDougall asserts that the space age did not usher in a new era
of cooperation, nor was it disconnected from the geopolitical mechanisms of earth-bound policy.
Rather, it simply extended business as usual to a new realm. 83 The American technocracy that
the genesis of the space age solidified and the international legal framework that U.S.-Soviet
competition created persist in the 21st century.
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Eisenhower was surely right-the American system was not set up for central planning,
nor did its values condone it. But JFK was also right-the old invisible hand was no longer
equal to the foreign challenge in the age of technological revolution. In the end, the
United States got the worst of both worlds: a free market twisted at every turn by state
intervention and a technocratic state incapable of managing the change it provoked. 84
John Logsdon chronicles the Cold War space program in two fantastic works, John F. Kennedy
and the Race to the Moon and After Apollo: Richard Nixon and the American Space Program,
which echo McDougall’s assertions. When examining recent space policy decisions it is easy to
see influences of both American strategic culture and vestiges of Cold War policy, not all of
which are conducive to the current geopolitical realities.
Sino-U.S. space relations is a niche policy community that has gained relevance as a
result of China’s military transformation and its expanded influence in East Asia combined with
a series of key U.S. policy decisions such as the withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty, International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) reform following the 1999 Cox
Report, and U.S. Air Force doctrine published during the Bush administration. In particular, the
2007 Chinese kinetic ASAT test that destroyed a defunct weather satellite spawned new interest
in the topic. There are fewer than a dozen strategic thinkers that have a disproportionate voice in
this community and their tireless analysis can be coalesced into a few common themes. 85 First,
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strategists from both sides see space as a major component of future conflict, including an antiaccess/ area denial (A2/AD) campaign in East Asia. Next, space operations are disturbing the
equilibrium of strategic deterrence. Finally, the rapid growth of the space industry in China is
expediting development of a Chinese technocracy.
Much of the literature on Sino-U.S. space policy focuses on the war fighting domain. The
Chinese Direct Ascent ASAT test in 2007 spawned a significant amount of literature pertaining
to China’s military space strategy and capabilities, particularly focused on how it could threatens
to disrupt U.S. space superiority in an East Asian conflict. A short, but insightful peace by Larry
Wortzel links space warfare with Chinese national sovereignty. He contends that U.S. space
domination threatens Chinese sovereignty because it can be used by the U.S. to project power
into East Asia and interfere with Chinese affairs. 86 Also, the ill-defined legal régime for space is
commonly viewed as an opportunity for the U.S. to extend its national sovereignty into the space
domain at the expense of China. 87 Ashley Tellis, in a journal article titled China’s Military Space
Strategy, emphasizes that China’s military space capabilities are not aimed at gaining superiority
in space. Rather, they are focused on blunting hegemonic and unilateral action by the United
States to establish space dominance. 88 Because Beijing recognizes the comparative advantage
that asymmetric counterspace weapons give its military, a legal regime limiting these capabilities
is improbable. 89 In The Chinese Vision of Space Military Operations Kevin Pollpeter conducts a
thorough analysis of Chinese perspectives on space warfare from primary sources. He agrees
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with Tellis that the Chinese military is primarily concerned with preventing U.S. dominance, but
emphasizes that offensive weapons and first-strike tactics are at the forefront of Chinese
strategy. 90 Also, Pollpeter emphasizes that the PLA does not have parity with U.S. military space
capabilities, but is undergoing a concerted effort to eliminate this disparity. 91 Two resources are
particularly important for assessing comparative capabilities. First is the 2017 RAND report The
U.S-China Military Scorecard. This assesses the general threat to capabilities that each side
poses to the other and accounts for the tyranny of distance by comparing a Taiwan conflict close
to the Chinese mainland with a prospective conflict in the Spratly Islands. 92 Second, Michael
Pillsbury examines specific Chinese capabilities against American space targets in his 2007
report to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
Around the same time as the 2007 Chinese ASAT test another strain of literature started
growing out of the space policy community that generally describes the changing nature of SinoU.S. deterrence. It is a response to the Bush Administration National Space Policy (NSP), the
U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and Chinese pushback against
these two events. Sitting atop the pantheon of this literature is The Paradox of Power: SinoAmerican Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability by David Gompert and Phillip Saunders.
They argue that the integration of space capabilities into the U.S. national economy and military
operations has elevated it to a strategic domain, on par with nuclear weapons in their ability to
strike at core national interests. Unfortunately, the offensive dominance of the space domain
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makes it difficult to deny gains while the asymmetric dependence on space reduces the
effectiveness of symmetric cost imposing strategies. In addition to the rather straightforward
application of Jervis the authors add two valuable insights. First, China has little fear of
escalation into the nuclear domain due to strategic decoupling between space/conventional
warfare and nuclear warfare. Second, the monetary and human cost of space warfare is far less
than that of nuclear weapons or even conventional warfare. 93 This means that ASAT weapons
have become a credible method of strategic deterrence in addition to a powerful conventional
warfighting tool. Two separate reports were commissioned to examine how space has changed
the nature of Sino-U.S. deterrence and generally agree with Gompert and Saunders. 94 Another
important thematic element of the “deterrence revisited” literature is the Chinese fear that U.S.
space control and potential weaponization could endanger its strategic nuclear deterrent
capability. This subsequently jeopardizes Chinese territorial integrity by making it susceptible to
nuclear blackmail. 95 From this literature it is clear that space has a very different purpose for
strategic deterrence in the minds of Chinese and American strategists.
The successes of the Shenzhou and Tiangong manned space programs and stated
ambitions for deep space exploration spawned another strain of literature focused on the
technocratic aims of the Chinese space program. Two works in particular stand out, The New
Space Race: China vs. the United States by Erik Seedhouse and Asia’s Space Race: National
Motivations, Regional Rivalries and International Risks by James Clay-Moltz. Manned related
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and scientific space programs have little direct utility for national security and relatively small
return on investment in and of themselves, but still factor into Chinese assessment of
comprehensive national power. Seedhouse believes that the pursuit of a manned space program
is a demonstration of China’s rising technological prowess and self-sufficiency. The program is
designed to reap soft power/prestige benefits and position China as a leader in Asia. 96 Moltz
echoes Seedhouse’s position on motivations, but makes a solid case that China’s technocratic
demonstration is more for the benefit of other Asian nations rather than the United States. The
Asian nations are closely monitoring the gains of their competitors and competing for relative
rather than absolute gains. 97 Within China, the space program is being used to promote largescale educational, economic, and social development as well as enhance the CCP mandate. 98 One
of Moltz’s students provides a fantastic analysis of how the Chinese space program is being used
to reap soft power benefits. He agrees with the assertion that China is occupying an underserved
niche by assisting/subsidizing developing nations’ space programs in order to increase national
prestige without triggering counterbalancing actions. 99 The use of space for political and
diplomatic means makes it a powerful tool for the CCP as their capabilities grow. Therefore,
space policy could serve as an opportunity to foster cooperation and communication between
China, the U.S., and other Asian nations. However, as space becomes intertwined with Chinese
national identity the threat that U.S. capabilities present grows proportionally.
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E. ROADMAP
Chapter II will form the basis of a game theoretical analysis using purely structural variables
(relative economic and military power). First, simplifying assumptions will be outlined. Next,
utility will be assigned to each of the four outcomes possible in a 2x2 game by examining the
space programs of China and the United States in the context of the broader strategic
relationship. Then, the validity of the zero-sum assumption will be tested by exploring
technology, geography, and economic factors at play in the space domain. Chapter III assesses
the cognitive biases present in China and the United States’ decision making apparatuses in order
to ascertain how utility may be altered by perception. The analysis will focus on how
unmotivated biases affect decision making under risk using prospect theory. Motivated biases
will be accounted for by examining the strategic cultures of both players. Chapter IV will
perform a short-medium term predictive analysis and present policy recommendations based on
the analysis in chapters II and III.
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II.

Modeling for Structural Factors

A. Building the Game
Chapter II will seek to describe the structural factors underlying Sino-U.S. relations using a
realist framework. This framework is highly compatible with game theory and allows for a
variety of simplifying assumptions when building a model of Sino-U.S. space relations. 100 The
first assumption is that the world order exists in a state of anarchy, precluding the existence of an
international sovereign who may put bounds on state behavior. 101 Therefore, a state is assumed
to be unrestricted by the expectations placed on it by tertiary actors within the international
system. Second, the model assumes perfect rationality, under which each actor has perfect
information and will choose the course of action that maximizes their own utility. 102 Third, it is
assumed that global utility is constant (zero-sum), resulting in a condition where one player’s
utility can only be increased at the expense of another. In international relations, this zero-sum
relationship occurs when one state’s security may only be increased by consequently decreasing
the security of another. Since states often seek to control areas outside their own borders for both
offensive and defensive reasons, the zero-sum assumption is independent of the power/security
seeking dichotomy of offensive and defensive realism. 103 Regardless of intentions, this
expansion of responsibilities, commitments, and military power may inherently threaten others.
Finally, the game will initially be represented as simultaneous and non-iterative.
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The simple 2x2 matrix used in this analysis is represented in Figure 1.
China
C

D

C

CC

CD

D

CD

DD

U.S.

Figure 1: Simple 2x2 Game Matrix
“C” represents each player’s choice to cooperate, which may include a reduction in offensive
weapons, treaties, or assuming defensive posture. D represents each player’s choice to defect,
which may include the buildup of offensive weapons, assuming hostile posture, or taking hostile
actions. When both players choose to cooperate (CC), potential gains may be wrought, but when
both players choose to defect, excessive arms buildup and war may result in loss by both players.
The third possible outcome is when one player cooperates while the other defects (CD). In this
scenario, the player that defects can reap significant benefits while the player that cooperates
stands to suffer substantial loses. The ordinal preference of each player can be shown in Figure 2.
“x” represents the preference order of the U.S. and “y” represents the preference order of China
China
C

D

C

x,y

x,y

D

x,y

x,y

U.S.

Figure 2: 2x2 matrix with ordinal preferences. U.S. preferences are represented by “x” and
Chinese preferences are represented by “y”.
The magnitude of these preferences may also be quantified to show the utility the players
experience given each outcome (CC, CD, DC, DD). Chapter II will examine each outcome
sequentially and determine the utility that the players derive from each one.
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B. Defining Preferences
In short, space control is the act of securing the space medium for the purpose of providing
freedom of access to space and freedom of action in space, while simultaneously denying the
enemy access to the medium. 104 This can be accomplished through kinetic or non-kinetic means,
by on-orbit or terrestrial assets, and may act on any part of the space system. In order to maintain
access to space, a state must have a functioning space support system. Space support is the
ability to sustain satellites and their capabilities on-orbit through day-to-day management and
field new systems when required. 105 Although much has been written about space support and
space control, it is essential to realize that they are simply a vehicle by which to provide
terrestrial effects from space. In a military sense, force enhancement is the mission of space
systems to increase the effectiveness of terrestrial military operations, while force application is
the ability to impose kinetic and non-kinetic measure from space in pursuit of joint combat
objectives. 106 From a policy perspective, space control and space support must not be viewed in
isolation; rather, they should be viewed through the lens of the force enhancement mission that
they support.
Fundamentally, cooperation between the U.S. and China is based on maintaining the status
quo of free access to space in accordance with existing international treaties and customary law.
The primary laws governing the peaceful use of outer space, for which China and the U.S. are
both signatories, include the Outer Space Treaty (OST), Rescue Agreement, Liability
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Convention, and Registration Convention. 107 Article IV of the OST prohibits the placement of
nuclear weapons in orbit and forbids the placement of any weapons on a celestial body. Although
the OST requires the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, it does not prohibit
conventional weapons in space or provide a definition for what could be considered a space
weapon. The vagueness of the OST, particularly article IV, amounts to a crisis in space law and
will be covered at length in later sections. 108 Despite the previously mentioned ambiguity, this
analysis will assume that cooperation entails both the adherence to existing legal regimes and the
limitation of the capability to wage war in and from the space domain. 109 This includes limiting
space control and on-orbit force application capabilities. Alternatively, defection between the
U.S. and China involves preventing free access to space through the manipulation of
international law, the building and maintaining of space control capabilities, or the building and
maintaining of on-orbit force application capabilities. These broad definitions are essential for
two reasons: first, they acknowledge that the Sino-U.S. space policy game is nested inside a
larger game of Sino-U.S. geostrategic relations, given that space power is a fundamental element
of national power. Second, it accounts for the practical limitations in foundational, codified space
law.
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a. Cooperate/Cooperate
China is highly incentivized by the prospects of mutual cooperation in space. Maintaining
free access to space is analogous to free sea lines of communication, which are primarily
guaranteed by U.S. military power. 110 This guarantee has allowed China to become the world’s
largest importer and exporter, accumulating $4.3T of total trade in 2014 and catalyzing a massive
economic resurgence. 111 Similarly, there is evidence that China aims to take advantage of free
access to space to continue its national rejuvenation into post-industrial future. In 2013, General
Secretary Xi Jinping announced the “China Dream” to rejuvenate China by building national
pride, engineering an economic revolution, and rebuilding China’s military. 112 Xi has linked a
“space dream” as a means of fulfilling the “China Dream”. 113 After the launch of the manned
Shenzhou-10 mission in 2013 he stated, “The space dream is part of the dream to make China
stronger. With the development of space programs, the Chinese people will take bigger strides to
explore further into space,” and went on to compare the Chinese manned space program to the
Long March. 114 Similarly, Lt. Gen. Zhang Yulin stated, “The earth-moon space will be
strategically important for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” 115 The connection
between China’s space program and national rejuvenation touted by CCP leaders is particularly
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strong in relation to the manned space program, which has ambitious development milestones
planned until 2045. 116
Space power and manned space accomplishments serve to benefit China in five ways.
First, success in space forms a nationalist narrative and creates a positive focal point for national
pride, counter to the negative images of the Tianamen Square massacre and China’s consistently
poor human rights record. 117 Maintaining an independent and self-reliant space program helps
the CCP craft a narrative based on technological development, social progress, and sustainable
development. This lends legitimacy to CCP leadership of China and stokes nationalism. 118
Additionally, the dissemination and control of satellite communication gives the CCP a medium
by which to propagate its own political interpretation of world events. 119
Second, the economic benefit gained from China’s space program is essential to
upholding the informal social contract between the Chinese people and the CCP, one that is
based on continued economic growth and an increase in quality of life. China seeks to make its
space program a driver of economic and technological advancement in a variety of ways.
Primarily, they believe that spin-off technologies from the space program could have up to a 1:10
cost to benefit ratio. 120 This creates a cycle where the Chinese space program generates
technology, technology spurs economic development, and economic development supports the
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space program. 121 The export of commercial space services will be a driver of economic
development as a producer of both jobs and hard currency. 122 Additionally, the space industry
spurs the development of a high technology industry by creating a market for high-skill labor and
products. 123 The industrial and academic base required for the development of a strong space
program is projected to have multi-order effects across other key industries and inspire young
Chinese to pursue a career in the sciences. 124 Next, the use of satellite application technologies is
critical to China’s economic development. 125 The use of geological, weather, and positional data
is essential to developing China’s limited resources and guarding her fragile environment. 126 A
multitrillion-dollar infrastructure project called the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) was
announced by Xi in 2013. The purpose of this project is to harness latent Chinese industrial
capacity to enhance strategic connection between China and the rest of the Eurasian landmass. 127
China’s space development has been specifically linked to BRI by the China National Space
Administration’s (CNSA) director of international cooperation, Jiang Hui. In a brief to the
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), Hui highlighted a long term plan
focused on building the Chinese space industry and leveraging space capabilities (particularly
geospatial, communication, and navigation systems) to build a spatial information corridor. 128
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Third, China is using spacepower as a way to develop prestige and reap soft power gains.
The success of the Chinese space program infers significant leadership connotation in the region
and is intended to establish Beijing at the forefront of Asia’s technology and economic
development. 129 Orbital accomplishments and space technology development is seen as a herald
for advancement in agriculture, resource management, communications, and disaster
management as well as a symbol of national scientific and economic infrastructures. Therefore,
they play a deeply symbolic role in Asia, with significant prestige to be gained by accomplishing
space “firsts” within the region. 130 Beijing has made an effort to translate the success of its space
program for the purposes of seizing regional leadership, boosting soft power, and incorporating
space into BRI. 131 It created the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) in 2008,
which consists of China, Iran, Mongolia, Peru, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia, and
Thailand. 132 China has donated ground systems, personnel training, and remote sensing data to
member countries. 133 Two other major Asian space cooperation organizations exist: the Japanese
created and led Asian-Pacific Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) and the Indian created and led
Center for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP). 134 The
purpose of these organizations is to reduce the costs of expensive space programs through
resource pooling and increasing diplomatic ties between partner nations. Unfortunately, member
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nation overlap is mostly limited to smaller countries, and the presence of three competing
organizations in the same region, each with similar missions led by separate space powers, may
result in factionalism rather than cooperation. 135
In addition to strengthening China economically, the export of commercial space services
and the use of satellite application technologies may also have far reaching diplomatic benefits.
China has served as an eager provider of space services and technologies to international
markets, particularly for developing countries. 136 Providing low-cost, partially subsidized space
services to developing nations is a powerful diplomatic initiative relating to resource extraction
and basing rights. 137 China provided Brazil a low-cost alternative to the LANDSAT remote
sensing data via a cooperative venture called Chinese-Brazilian Earth Resources Satellite
(CBERS). The cost was split 70/30 by China and Brazil. 138 China manufactured, launched, and
operated communications and imaging satellites for oil rich Venezuela. 139 Similarly, China
generously subsidized Nigeria’s first communications satellite for $550M as part of the BRI,
with Nigerian oil rights serving as collateral. 140 Bolivia enjoyed a similar arrangement, as 85% of
its first communications satellite was subsidized by loans from China and built by the Great Wall
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Industry Corporation. 141 Likewise, China designed, launched, and heavily subsidized a Pakistani
geosynchronous communication satellite under BRI in exchange for Beidou ground stations in
Karachi and Lahore. 142 This was followed by the development and launch of a remote sensing
satellite in 2018. 143 These acts of space diplomacy are consistent with China’s larger foreign
policy efforts to open international markets. 144
Fourth, the Chinese space program sets the groundwork for scientific and economic
exchange between China and Europe. Since the 1960s, Europe has sought independence from the
U.S. space industry. Aside from the general predilection to maintain sovereignty, this desire has
been amplified by a series of heavy handed U.S. space policy decisions. During the acquisition
and early assembly of the space station throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Europeans were
frustrated with the partnership with the U.S. Rapidly changing requirements and budget cuts
gave them reason to enter negotiations with less than full faith in U.S. commitments. The nature
of this partnership made Europeans feel as though they were being treated as a subcontractor
rather than a full partner, and constantly proliferating Department of Defense (DoD)
requirements served as an early example of Pentagon influence in civilian space. 145 The Gulf
War and the subsequent emphasis on space as a military technology in U.S. policy led Europe to
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grow weary of U.S. shutter control for commercial assets and selective service for government
owned utilities. 146 Likewise, the Cox report and corresponding restrictive export control
initiatives (ITAR) and Export Administration Regulation (EAR) in the early 2000s caused
backlash in Europe, creating a demand for export-control-free products and leading Europe to
seek non-U.S. markets for its space technology. 147 Wariness of U.S. restrictions created a mutual
desire for ITAR-free products. Europe primarily seeks to gain a market for high technology
products while China seeks training and scientific exchange. 148 These desires drive Sino-E.U.
cooperation and set the foundation for China’s science and technology diplomacy to Europe. 149
In the past decade, increasing parity between U.S. and “rest-of-world” technologies has made
ITAR free products more feasible. 150
Fifth, the opportunity cost of the perpetual “guns verses butter” debate applies to the
space domain as well. For example, the U.S. military’s space budget is over $12 billion
(unclassified spending) while NASA’s projected FY2019 budget is $21 billion. 151 A system of
mutual restraint would have the benefit of potentially freeing up billions of dollars from the
military space budget to dedicate to civilian space spending. Although military space spending
would remain high, a significant amount of money could be cut from space control spending
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($2B), reducing the cost of existing military space projects due to loosened requirements on
survivability, redundancy, and maneuverability. 152 Although China’s government spending is
opaque, rough estimates are available. As of 2017, the U.S. spends approximately $610B (3.1%
of GDP) annually on defense while China spends only $228B (1.9% of GDP). 153 In terms of
purchase power parity (PPP), China’s actual budget doubles to $434B. 154 Likewise, China’s
$3.5B space budget appears to be dwarfed by U.S. space spending. However, when % of GDP
and PPP are taken into account, China appears to be much more competitive with the U.S. in
terms of space budget. 155 Therefore, it is expected that China will reap similar budgetary benefits
from a system of mutual restraint. This adds an even stronger incentive for both nations to
cooperate.
In an absolute sense, the benefits of free access to space and the ability to pursue robust
commercial utilization gives the impression of a strong desire for mutual cooperation. However,
the zero-sum relationship should not be overlooked. The market for space technology is both
limited and competitive, meaning that free access to space and the development of the space
industry free from tariff or political restriction benefits China significantly, to the extent that it
can increase relative market share in the $320 billion space economy. 156 Moving beyond
competition within the space industry, the relative gain that the U.S. and China each derive from
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the utilization of space modifies the magnitude of preference for mutual cooperation. For
example, if China gains X from a system of mutual cooperation while the U.S. gains X + 15,
then the magnitude of China’s preference for this outcome must be proportionally lower than that
of the U.S. Although the multi-order effects of the space industry are difficult to quantify, a
simple analysis of spending and space assets can give an estimate of the relative importance of
each nation’s space program. Table 1 is a quick reference comparing U.S. and Chinese space
assets. 157
Table 1: Total number of U.S. and Chinese satellites by orbital régime and function (as of April
2019).
Total Number of U.S. Satellites: 858
Civil: 20

Commercial: 494

Government: 178

Military 166

GEO: 189

MEO: 31

LEO: 616

HEO: 22

Total Number of Chinese Satellites: 250
Civil: 25

Commercial: 46

Government: 113

Military: 100

GEO: 56

MEO:24

LEO: 203

HEO: 1

The current space regime and total absence of space weapons is highly advantageous to the
United States. 158 The relative magnitude of preference can be shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: China and the U.S.’s utility given a cooperate/cooperate outcome.
b. Defect/Defect
The ubiquity of space technology has also yielded the negative externality of
overcrowding the space domain. Despite its seemingly unlimited size, there are a limited number
of useful earth-centric orbits to optimize terrestrial coverage. It is projected that there are over
300,000 medium sized objects capable of causing catastrophic failure of a satellite upon collision
currently in earth’s orbit. 159 Of these objects, 20,000 are actively tracked by the comparatively
robust space surveillance network (SSN) of the United States Air Force, only 1,000 are active
payloads, and even fewer have maneuver capability. 160 Recent trends indicate that the problem of
orbital congestion will only worsen in the coming decades as the barriers to entry are reduced.
Launch service cost is rapidly decreasing due to an increased number of service providers and
technology revolutions such as reusable rockets. Also, the miniaturization and simplification of
satellite payloads further reduces the cost and infrastructure needed to be a spacefairing
nation. 161 This is evidenced by the near doubling of state operated satellites from 27 in 2000 to
over 50 in 2012, coupled with a near doubling in total space objects from 1997 to 2007. 162
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The accumulation of space debris is a vital concern to the sustainable development of the
space environment due to the increased probability of conjunction between active payloads and
all other objects that results from crowded orbits. This increase in collision probability occurs
proportionally to the number of objects in a given orbital domain. The tripling of orbital debris
projected to occur in the next century, due to routine use and accumulation alone, would cause a
tenfold increase in the probability of collision. In the event of a catastrophic collision between
two objects, the resulting debris cloud could cause a cascading effect. Each successive collision
increases the probability of another occurrence in a given orbit until an instability threshold is
reached. At this threshold, debris removal due to decay would be negligible compared to debris
created by subsequent collisions. As the propagation of debris continues, the cost of launching a
satellite would eventually outweigh the benefits received due to the probability of that asset
being destroyed by errant debris, effectively rendering the given orbit unusable. This debris
propagation model and the dangers associated with it are colloquially referred to as the Kessler
Syndrome. Kessler asserts unstable regions of low earth orbit (LEO) currently exist and that,
barring the addition of more debris, a major collision would occur once every 10-20 years. If
debris doubles, as it has in the last decade, the collision rate would increase to 2.5 years.
Although most models’ time scales are on the order of centuries, it is widely accepted that the
current rate of debris accumulation will render critical orbits unusable unless immediate
measures are taken to return stability. 163
There is near universal acceptance of the danger space debris presents, yet little
substantive action has been taken to solve the problem. Current debris accumulation and
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propagation models show that earth orbiting domains are finite resources. Continued
unsustainable development moving forward may preclude future usage, making earth orbits
rivalrous goods. 164 Furthermore, orbital domains are made a non-excludable good by the OST
which states, “Outer space… shall be free for exploration and use by all States without
discrimination of any kind.” 165 As a non-excludable public good, space succumbs to the tragedy
of the commons where the privately beneficial strategy of space utilization differs significantly
from the socially optimal strategy promoting orbital stability. 166 Understandably, most analysis
has focused on solving the problem of orbital instability by addressing the market failure
responsible for debris creation. The current reasoning suggests that if actors creating space debris
internalize the cost of their actions, a solution can arise. Proposed solutions run the gamut of
ideologies from free market tax incentives, to command and control legislation, to restructuring
orbital property rights. Scientific solutions have also been proposed, but technological feasibility
and cost remain major problems. Furthermore, analogous environments susceptible to the
tragedy of the commons have been examined in hopes that they may prove applicable to the
problem of orbit instability. 167 This analysis is ultimately useful if the problem is to be solved
under nominal conditions, but there is an underlying problem that needs to be addressed before
any of these proposed solutions can realistically be enacted.
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On January 11, 2007 the Chinese government conducted a direct ascent anti-satellite
(ASAT) test on the defunct Fengyun-1C weather satellite. This event is the single greatest source
of orbital debris, as it created 3,000 objects greater than 10cm out of 20,000 total tracked by the
U.S. SSN, and an estimated 150,000 smaller untracked objects. 168 Due to the limitations of the
SSN, the extent of the debris cloud has not been completely characterized, but NASA estimates
Fengyun-1C debris comprises one third of LEO debris. 169 Between the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos
collision and the destruction of the Fengyun-1C, the number of cataloged fragmentation debris
doubled after remaining stable during the 20 years prior. The Fengyun-1C debris cloud has been
deemed dangerous to LEO, proving responsible for multiple near collisions or spacecraft
damaging incidents. Within six months of the test, NASA’s Terra spacecraft and the
International Space Station (ISS) both required orbit changes to reduce collision probability with
Fengyun-1C debris. In 2013, a Russian cubesat was damaged by a small piece of debris. 170
Alarmingly, the severity of the ASAT test far exceeded NASAs standard break-up prediction
model, making Kessler’s original predictions seem conservative. 171 Intentional, avoidable debris
creating incidents exacerbate an already dire problem, threatening to push affected orbital
regimes into instability and eliminate their future usefulness. The Fengyun-1C debris cloud
exists in the 750km-900km orbital regime that hosts critical scientific and application spacecraft.
The underlying problem is that satellites with a given mission tend to group together in a
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relatively narrow orbital regime because it is physically advantageous for accomplishing that
task. ASATs seek to destroy an enemy’s capability, but in doing so have the externality of
putting other satellites performing a similar mission at risk. Therefore, kinetic ASAT warfare is
incompatible with the sustainable development of space.
Despite global outrage over the 2007 test, China maintains a robust ASAT program. In
2008 astronauts conducting the first Chinese spacewalk released a microsat that passed
dangerously close to the ISS and was thought to be a demonstration of a co-orbital ASAT
capability. 172 Kinetic kill ASAT launches in 2013 and 2015 used the same booster as the 2007
Fengyun-1C test but are thought to demonstrate the ability to hold orbits above LEO at risk. 173 In
2018, a new booster was tested, indicating intentional progression of the kinetic ASAT program
through continued technology development. 174 As China’s kinetic ASAT program reaches initial
operational capability (estimated for 2020), the development of road-mobile assets serves the
purpose of increasing the survivability of its ASAT capability. 175 China’s official policy
emphasizes the peaceful use of outer space and calls for a ban on space weapons. In 2008, China
and Russia jointly submitted a draft treaty designed to curb the weaponization of space and
prevent a space arms race at the UN Conference on Disarmament. The proposal called for a ban
on orbiting weapons, but specifically excluded earth-based weapons, as well as direct ascent
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ASATs. 176 The clear desire to continue developing ASAT technology, despite significant soft
power repercussions, is indicative that holding an opponent’s space capabilities at risk is a key
part of China’s strategic development. It presents a seemingly usable sub-nuclear option for
credible strategic deterrence and may also be used for conventional warfighting.
Anti-satellite weapons existed during the Cold War, but a system of mutual restraint
developed by the United States and Russia ensured that the probability of using them remained
very low. A conflict in space between the two rivals was likely to expand into other domains,
including nuclear warfare. Reciprocity and escalation was expected in the event of a kinetic
ASAT attack, and a series of robust firebreaks arose to prevent experimental missteps by both
nations. The use of ASATs represented the ultimate no-win situation for either side as there was
no significant comparative advantage to be gained from their use. 177 It was necessity and fear
that drove the superpowers to establish international conventions, such as the OST and Liability
Convention, to codify acceptable behavior in space. The significant consequences of nuclear war
meant that the mechanisms of strategic restraint were well developed and well understood by
both powers in order to lower the probability of a catastrophic breakdown occurring. However,
these mechanisms do not exist in Sino-U.S. relations due to asymmetry in the strategic domains.
China has adopted a no nuclear first strike policy and an examination of its current capabilities
supports that rhetoric. Its second strike capability is, in its own estimation, only enough to deter a
first strike by the United States and avoid escalation dominance in the nuclear domain. The
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Chinese are unwilling to bear the cost of an expanded nuclear arsenal to counter U.S. capabilities
and see little to be gained from a nuclear arms race with the United States. 178 The lack of nuclear
parity means that the consequences of space warfare between the two countries are lower
because the conflict does not present a substantial risk of escalating to the nuclear domain. This
strategic decoupling present in Sino-U.S. relations fundamentally increases the probability of an
attack against satellite systems. 179
Given the risk to the space environment presented by kinetic ASAT warfare and the robust
capability of China and the United States to hold the entire domain at risk, it initially appears as
if the cost of mutual defection is much greater than the benefit to be gained from mutual
cooperation. The cost of mutual defection accounts for the loss of the space domain (for both
current and future use) and is proportional to the gain from mutual cooperation. This is
represented in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: China and the U.S.’s utility given a defect/defect outcome.
However, due to the advancement of non- and low-kinetic ASAT technology, holding an
opponent’s space assets at risk while continuing to use the domain are not mutually exclusive
strategies. Space systems are comprised of space, ground, and user segments integrated through
data links. Any of these segments and links can be targeted by an attack to gain the desired
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effect; the attacks can take place on a variable time scale, with or without creating debris, and
causing permanent or reversible damage to a space system. The severity of these effects can be
scaled for level of conflict. 180 Electronic jamming of either uplink or downlink signals can
impair satellite functionality and serve as a cost-effective soft-kill weapon. Laser weapons
impact a satellite’s electro-optical detectors and can be used to temporarily blind a satellite or
achieve a hard kill. Similarly, radio frequency (RF) weapons can be used to cause a variable
amount of damage to satellites, depending on energy levels. Physical attacks on terrestrial
ground segments can disrupt weak points in the system. Likewise, cyber-attacks can disrupt
functionality without an attack on the space segment. Aside from the kinetic direct ascent ASAT
and co-orbital ASAT threats already mentioned, co-orbital rendezvous and grappling can
kinetically disable a satellite without creating excessive debris. 181
The DoD’s 2018 annual report to Congress about the Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China states,
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is acquiring a range of technologies to improve
China’s counterspace capabilities. In addition to the development of directed energy
weapons and satellite jammers, China is also developing direct-ascent and co-orbital
kinetic kill capabilities and has probably made progress on the anti-satellite missile
system it tested in July 2014. China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations
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and is probably testing dual-use technologies in space that could be applied to
counterspace missions. 182
The report also lists the development of solid-state and chemical lasers to be used on groundbased and airborne platforms as a focus of Chinese technological development. 183 A report
prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission noted extensive
Chinese academic literature concerning the jamming of U.S. military satellite communications
and the development of lasers for military purposes. 184
China has demonstrated its ability to carry out sub-lethal attacks on space systems. In 2006,
the NRO confirmed that Chinese lasers had illuminated U.S. satellites. 185 Although this test did
no permanent damage, it is significant for two reasons: first, scaling up power to cause
permanent damage is not prohibitively difficult, and second, satellite laser ranging (SLR) is
essential to China’s counterspace kill chain for direct ascent or co-orbital ASATs. 186
Furthermore, China has demonstrated robust proximity operation and co-orbital rendezvous
capability. The SJ-17, a GEO “technical demonstrator” satellite, has executed proximity
operations with at least four Chinese satellites, some close approaches coming within 1 km. 187
The satellite has also shown significant maneuver capability, alternating between a 10-20
degree/day drift rate and proximity operations with a relatively stationary object on multiple
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occasions. 188 Multiple other close proximity operations and co-orbital rendezvous missions have
occurred in the past decade, indicating a technically robust Chinese capability. 189 Most
importantly, Chinese cyber warfare capabilities are essential to disabling U.S. space C4ISR
capabilities during the initial stages of a conflict. 190 Multiple cyber-attacks against U.S. satellite
command and control systems are consistent with Chinese cyber warfare operations; however,
cyber-attack attribution is difficult and China denies all involvement. 191
Although the development of these technologies is in the technical demonstration phase and
may be far from initial operational capability, the option to fight a space war on a subcatastrophic level greatly impacts the game. Rather than a conflict in space inevitably resulting in
widespread environmental contamination, China has options for proportionality and escalation.
Although China’s most robust ASAT capability is direct ascent kinetic kill vehicles (KKV), it is
quickly fielding other means of interdicting U.S. space abilities. Therefore, the cost of mutual
defection in space is not automatically catastrophic, as it would be in a game of nuclear
brinksmanship. It cannot be assumed that in the case of Sino-U.S. conflict that the cost of mutual
defection is significantly greater than the benefit to be gained from mutual cooperation. In the
case of an arms race, the cost of defection would be the opportunity cost examined earlier. As
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more money is spent on defense, less is available to spend on beneficial commercial capabilities.
In the case of low to medium-grade conflict the cost of defection relies on a combination of the
value of one’s own space systems and the opponent’s capability to hold those systems at risk.
Due to a robust Chinese ASAT program and high value of U.S. space systems, there is a strong
U.S. aversion to this outcome. Similarly, U.S. ASAT programs can hold Chinese assets at risk
with a variety of means. However, the value of Chinese systems is considerably less than that of
the U.S.’s, therefore the Chinese aversion to mutual defection is less than that of the U.S. A
conflict where the KKV threshold has not been crossed is shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: China and the U.S.’s utility given a defect/defect outcome where no KKV threshold has
been crossed.
c. Defect/Cooperate
The magnitude of each player’s preference for Defect/Cooperate (D/C) is dependent on
its benefit from establishing space control (maintaining one’s own use of space or excluding an
opponent from doing so), while the magnitude of its aversion to Cooperate/Defect (C/D) is
dependent on the detriment of allowing the other player to do the same. In short, what is to be
gained or lost by one player establishing space control? If the players view each other as benign,
reasonably expecting that the other player gaining space control will not exclude their own use of
the domain, the magnitude of the C/D or D/C choice is negligible. The magnitude becomes
substantial when the ability of one player to deny use of the space domain to the other has
significant impact on the geostrategic balance of power. The economic benefit gained by being
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able to deny a competitor access to the marketplace is a clear advantage. However, the effect of
space control extends far beyond economics. Space effects play a critical role in the ability of the
U.S. and China to project both soft and hard power influence in East Asia.
Generally, space force enhancement functions include intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), launch detection, missile tracking, environmental monitoring, satellite
communication, positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) and navigation warfare
(NAVWAR). 192 China and the United States possess operationally mature capabilities that
enable them to perform all these functions, and are both actively improving their force
enhancement capabilities: communications satellites enable command and control (C2)
infrastructure to direct warfighting effort; launch detection and missile tracking allows for force
protection through early warning and ballistic missile defense (BMD) enhancement; space-based
ISR aids in forming a comprehensive picture of an adversary’s infrastructure and capabilities,
allows for robust targeting, and contributes to general situational awareness (SA); and PNT
increases the effectiveness of precision strike.
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Therefore, space-based operations remain a

vital part of the overall information architecture used to enable joint operations at all stages of a
conflict. 194 During a conflict in East Asia, space-based assets will be essential for the U.S. to be
able to conduct surveillance of Chinese warfighting capabilities, readiness, and military
movements for the purposes of knowing how to concentrate its own forces. Space-based assets
would be used to locate and track naval, air, and rocket forces, C2 nodes, ISR sensors, and troop
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staging areas, and would be used to direct, coordinate, and manage U.S. forces. This
functionality makes space a critical component of weapons performance and C2. 195 Both U.S.
and Chinese strategists have developed doctrine to account for the importance of integrated
information systems in military operations. China has formalized its concept of local wars under
informationized conditions in a 2004 defense white paper. 196 The U.S. concept of command,
control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) is
similar.
Although the use of C4ISR systems is essential to all modern battlefields, they have
greater utility when campaigns occur over long distances, large areas, and involve multi-domain
forces. Space-based C4ISR becomes particularly important when land, maritime, and air-based
systems are forced to operate at a high cost and can no longer provide broad area continuous
coverage. 197 Both of these conditions will likely be met during an anti-access, area denial
(A2/AD) campaign between the U.S. and China in East Asia. China intends to leverage its
continental position to employ weapon systems with longer range and heavier payloads than are
available to the U.S., who tends to act in an expeditionary capacity from maritime bases of
operation. This offensive capability will be combined with anti-satellite and cyber warfare
capabilities to overcome U.S. C4ISR advantage and mitigate its conventional deterrent threat
against mainland China. 198
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A2/AD campaigns have precedence in military history, from Salamis in 480 BCE, to the
Battle of Britain in 1940. 199 Most recently and relevantly, the Soviet Union fielded A2/AD
capabilities against the United States during the Cold War. Beginning in the 1970s, the Soviets
fielded capabilities to locate and target U.S. naval assets, including surveillance satellites,
submarines, and long-range, land-based reconnaissance aircraft. This was combined with antiship cruise missiles and long-range strike aircraft to create significant standoff distance between
U.S. carrier groups and the Russian mainland. Although the U.S. responded by fielding longrange, carrier-based strike aircraft, long-range air-to-air missiles, and anti-satellite capabilities to
counter the Soviet “reconnaissance-strike complex,” there was little continued emphasis on these
capabilities after the 1980s, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union. 200 The Chinese are rapidly
developing their version of the reconnaissance-strike complex with the benefit of 30 additional
years of technological advances. 201
China possesses a more than adequate supply of SRBMs, Land Attack Missiles, and
Anti-ship missiles that are survivable and mobile.
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Figure 6: Map of China’s offensive IRBM capabilities 202
It should be noted that the delivery of H-6 with LACM options is dependent on the ability of the
H-6 bomber to range into the western Pacific; additionally, the DF-26 is a nascent capability,
being revealed publicly for the first time in 2015. 203 This is a distinct advantage over the United
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States, who signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, which
prohibited it from maintaining ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between
500 and 5,500km. 204 The U.S. withdrew from the INF Treaty on February 01, 2019 ostensibly
citing Russia’s noncompliance with the treaty. 205 It is likely that the U.S. and its allies will begin
to develop their own IRBM centric reconnaissance-strike complex to counter that of China and
“level the playing field”. 206 However, it may take years for the U.S. and its allies to establish
parity with China in IRBM technology, tactics, and deployment. 207 Furthermore, IADS
infrastructure and air capabilities within mainland China, and on islands close to China’s coast,
are designed to prevent the U.S. from utilizing its global strike capability to interdict strategic
targets within China. 208 If they are able to do so, China can create a coastal defense zone that
U.S. forces cannot penetrate without accepting disproportionate risk. 209 However, offensive
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in U.S. tactics would increase the value of its space assets for targeting purposes, which would increase the value of
a defect/cooperate scenario for China. The complexities of MRBMs mean that it is too early to tell how they will
affect Sino-U.S. space policy. Incorporating the INF withdraw into this analysis could be a topic of further research,
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systems need to be integrated with an over-the-horizon C4ISR targeting network to operate
effectively. Satellite systems are an essential part of this network. 210
Currently, Chinese space-based ISR coverage lacks both persistence and integrated C2
infrastructure adequate for targeting highly mobile U.S. Navy assets, and remains the weakest
link in China’s targeting capabilities. 211 In the event of a conflict, these gaps may be temporarily
filled with launch-on-demand microsat constellations or repositioning existing capabilities. 212
Airborne ISR assets also have limited capabilities against naval assets, and will be operating in
contested airspace. 213 For a more long-term solution, new electro-optical, multi-spectral, and
synthetic aperture radar capabilities are top development priorities and are projected to give
China the ability to maintain a 30 minute revisit rate on U.S. naval forces by the early 2020s. 214
Additionally, the development of the Chinese Beidou PNT system, slated to be completed in
2020, will drastically improve the accuracy of Chinese munitions. 215 These two developments
will allow China to conduct Find, Fix, Target, Track, Engage, and Assess (F2T2EA) operations
against both land and maritime assets within range of its land-based missiles.
Within the physically large and geographically complex East Asian theater of operations,
the success of conducting or countering A2/AD operations is largely reliant on the ability to
maintain C4ISR operations, while denying the opponent the same capabilities. Consequently,
both China and the United States are highly incentivized to acquire robust space force
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enhancement capabilities, as well as offensive and defensive space control capabilities, in order
to maintain the C4ISR edge. Space becomes increasingly important to A2/AD campaigns as both
nations move further from their established bases (for example, if Sino-U.S. military interactions
were to expand into the Indian Ocean). 216
Despite rapidly growing capabilities, there is evidence to suggest that Chinese strategists
view themselves as possessing a relatively disadvantageous position in space operations
compared to the United States. The strength of the U.S. position and vulnerability of Chinese
capabilities is accentuated in PLA literature. 217 They have observed three decades of space
support in U.S. military operations and have assessed that the United States has a high reliance
on military space effects to support a terrestrial campaign. 218 Observing American operations in
the Persian Gulf Wars, Kosovo, and Afghanistan has resulted in the belief that space systems
cannot be divorced from their ability to help achieve the goals of terrestrial operations, and that
space warfare will be decisive in gaining informational superiority during a regional conflict. 219
Chinese military literature estimates that the U.S. relied on space support for over 90% of all
military communications, PNT, and reconnaissance and surveillance information during the
Second Gulf War. It is estimated that this reliance has nearly doubled between the First and
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Second Gulf Wars. 220 These campaigns served as a wake-up call within the PLA due to the
effective execution of a war under informationalized conditions against a mechanized
opponent. 221 Early American “informationalized” campaigns serve as a good analogy to a
potential American campaign in the Pacific due to the mechanization of the Chinese military and
the expeditionary requirements on the U.S. military.
Given the vast technological advantage that the U.S. holds over China in such a critical
warfighting domain, Chinese tacticians will not be able to wage a symmetric war. Rather, their
concept of operations (CONOPS) employs asymmetric means in order to wage a limited conflict,
with a focus on information warfare to create a temporary, localized advantage. This advantage
is intended to deter U.S. intervention by eliminating their ability to hold Chinese assets at risk
(denial of gains) while making action against China prohibitive in terms of both monetary and
human cost (cost imposition). 222 At the outset of the conflict, China may attack key U.S.
capabilities for the purpose of crippling their ability to fight a war including C4ISR systems;
logistics, transportation, and support facilities; air bases; sea lines of communication; and the
American Pacific fleet. 223 Chinese military literature has emphasized anti-satellite weapons as
key capabilities to interdict American C4ISR capabilities and offset American advantage. 224 This
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idea has taken hold in the Chinese military to the point that space is often identified as America’s
Achilles heel. 225
The Chinese strategy of using counterspace weapons to gain localized, temporary military
advantage in order to achieve limited political aims makes two assumptions. First, the effects of
Chinese counterspace capabilities must sufficiently disrupt the American F2T2EA process to
deny U.S. gains from striking Chinese high value targets. As discussed above, the PLA is
acquiring a range of technologies to improve its counterspace capabilities, including directed
energy weapons, electronic warfare systems, and kinetic ASAT capabilities. 226 However, it is
important to differentiate between aspirational and operationally mature systems. 227 The
development of chemical and solid state laser technologies for employment in ground based
and/or airborne weapon-grade systems is a top technology development priority for the PLA. 228
Despite a major research effort to this effect, the most tangible demonstration of the Chinese
laser program has been a network of seven satellite laser ranging (SLR) stations that are capable
of providing high-fidelity observation of space objects. These ranging stations operate at too low
of power to damage optical sensors, but could be used as a critical piece of a counterspace kill
chain for other anti-satellite systems (for example, a direct ascent kinetic ASAT). 229 Although
scaling up the technology does not present a difficult technical problem, fielding a mobile,
forward deployable capability may present difficulties. 230 Likewise, co-orbital systems are in the
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tech-demonstration phase and do not pose an operationally mature threat to U.S. capabilities.
Forward deployed electromagnetic counterspace assets have the disadvantage of revealing the
very capabilities they are attempting to conceal. Additionally, the U.S. has the advantage of
defense in depth due to the sheer number of military space assets that it possesses. There is no
guarantee that reversible effects employed against low-density, high demand assets will have the
desired effects against American forces. 231 Therefore, creating a C4ISR advantage may be reliant
on employing a direct ascent ASAT capability. China has rapidly improved its ASAT capability
since the initial 2007 debris causing event, conducting numerous tests and demonstrating its
capability to hold objects at geosynchronous orbit at risk. 232 Chinese military units have
conducted operational training with ground-based ASAT missiles, which are expected to reach
operational maturity within the next few years. 233
Second, Chinese strikes on U.S. space assets must not result in uncontrolled escalation.
The advantage of possessing soft-kill technology is the suitability for low-intensity conflicts,
while the use of destructive/non-reversible attacks will not be constrained during high-intensity
conflicts. 234 The use of exclusively non-lethal versus a combination of lethal and non-lethal
capabilities can serve as strategic signaling about the phase of combat. However, due to a
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capability and vulnerability gap, combined with a lack of credible retaliatory threat, a tit-for-tat
strategy along a clearly defined escalation ladder may not be a legitimate strategy for the SinoU.S. relationship. 235 Counterspace action intended to have a tactical/operational effect may cross
American strategic red lines, resulting in unintended escalation. For example, an attack on
American overhead persistent infrared (OPIR) sensors would degrade their capability to detect
conventional medium range ballistic missiles, with targets in the first island chain also interfering
with the early detection of nuclear capable ICBMs launched against the U.S. 236 Concerningly
enough, there is evidence that the implication of interfering with or destroying strategically
important U.S. capabilities has only been appreciated on the tactical and operational levels
within the Chinese military. 237 Similarly, a Chinese attack on U.S. space systems at the outset of
a low-grade conflict could raise the likelihood of a “space Pearl Harbor,” which could, in turn,
provoke the United States to contemplate pre-emptive attacks or horizontal escalation on the
Chinese mainland. 238 In addition, commercial-military integration and combined efforts may
result in escalation with third parties. A significant portion of U.S. military communication and
imaging capabilities are purchased from commercial companies or provided by allied nations,
meaning that to adequately degrade U.S. military capabilities, an attack on non-military and/or
non-U.S. assets is required. 239
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Chinese strategists cannot sufficiently disrupt U.S. capabilities without the use of kinetic
capabilities, yet the use of kinetic capabilities will likely result in unacceptable escalation and
threaten their own access to space. 240 Considering this obstacle, China is incentivized to continue
developing more robust soft-kill counterspace capabilities to make its deterrent capabilities both
credible and usable. However, given the relationship asymmetry, no firmly established red lines,
and lack of an articulated escalation ladder, there is no guarantee that a soft-kill strategy will
contain escalation either. China may be forced to adopt a strategy of preemption and automatic
escalation due to the fear that any attack on space assets will result in American escalation.
Nevertheless, this strategy cedes China’s ability to conduct strategic signaling during a low-level
conflict. For these reasons, a system of mutual restraint has not been established under the
current status quo.
Moving forward, the asymmetry between Chinese and American forces in East Asia will
become less acceptable to China as its subjective security demands increase. In order to
strengthen its deterrent threat in East Asia (through robust A2/AD capabilities), China must
continue to develop its space based C4ISR systems. Consequently, the continued development of
C4ISR and space control systems risks instigating an arms race with the United States and
regional competitors, such as Japan and India. To avoid the potential conflict, China must
accomplish this development with the utmost sensitivity and secrecy in order to prevent a
counterbalancing reaction. In the context of the game theoretical framework, China is highly
incentivized to upset the status quo and has much to gain from a Defect/Cooperate scenario.
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Given the asymmetry in Chinese and American capabilities, China has more to gain from a
Defect/Cooperate outcome than they do from mutual cooperation.
If the United States permits Chinese military space capabilities to develop unopposed, two
possible dynamics may result. First, as China’s reliance on space increases, so will its
vulnerability to counterspace threats. This may allow for a system of mutual restraint to be
established between the U.S. and China in the space domain. 241 Second, as China’s conventional
space capabilities achieve parity with U.S. capabilities, the U.S.’s conventional deterrent threat
in the region could be weakened, consequently shifting the balance of power in East Asia
towards China. Due to the importance of trans-pacific trade in the U.S. economy, it is unlikely
that they will accept weakened extended deterrence in Asia. 242 Therefore, the United States
shows preference towards the risk of mutual defection to the risk of being taken advantage of in
a scenario where it cooperates in the face of Chinese defection. These preferences are shown in
Figure 7.
China
C

D

C

6, 3

-5, 8

D

x,y

-3, -1

U.S.

Figure 7: China and the U.S.’s utility given a U.S. cooperate/China defect outcome.
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d. Cooperate/Defect
The benefit of defecting while an opponent cooperates (i.e. pursuing space dominance) is
an attractive option for states seeking to expand their sphere of influence or those that have
judged that their security demands outweigh current capability. Although there is evidence that
China fits these criteria and that they are motivated by potential gains of Defect/Cooperate, it is
the fear of being exploited that makes Cooperate/Defect its most powerful preference. Extremely
stable states with low subjective security demands and a favorable strategic position (such as the
United States) have the luxury of being able to cooperate while their opponents defect. They can
take a relatively relaxed posture in security affairs and wait for others to make their intentions
clear before acting. 243 Alternatively, nascent countries in a weak geostrategic position could
ultimately face a loss of sovereignty if they chose to cooperate while an opponent defects. If
China allows the U.S. to develop its space control capabilities uninhibited and itself remains
unable to fight a space war, a loss of sovereignty could result for two possible reasons. 244 First,
as covered in earlier chapters, space support enables the United States to project military power
into East Asia. If the U.S. can maintain use of its space support capabilities while denying China
a vital link in the A2/AD chain, the U.S. is much more likely to have freedom of action close to
the Chinese coast. This interferes with China’s expanded sovereignty claims in the East China
Sea, South China Sea, Taiwan, and even outlying regions of continental China. It also gives U.S.
forces strong coercive power by way of their ability to strike at key ground targets within China
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and establish a blockade, grinding China’s largely sea-based economy to a halt. 245 Likewise, a
space blockade could deny China substantial economic benefits.
Second, space control, space weaponization, and space force application are interrelated
and legally contentious topics that have national sovereignty implications. The principal of
overflight is strongly rooted in customary international law, beginning with the flight of Sputnik
I during the Cold War. The ability of any nation to fly a satellite over any other nation on earth
without violating its universally recognized national boundaries, combined with the lack of a
prohibition of space weapons in the OST, theoretically allows for the delivery of kinetic effects
to any nation on earth with only minutes of warning. 246 The major proposed roles of space
weapons are: defensive space control, offensive space control, space-to-ground force projection,
and BMD. 247 Generally, space based defensive and offensive space control options are limited
by exorbitantly high cost, considerable susceptibility to countermeasures, and the availability of
cheaper, more effective ground-based alternatives. 248 Space-to-ground force projection options
are prohibitively expensive ($66 million/strike) and logistically difficult (40-150 satellites for
global coverage). 249 Additionally, due to the offensive nature of space-to-ground weapons, soft
power and legal consequences could raise the barriers to entry in developing and deploying such
systems. 250 Despite the cost, space-to-ground weapons are appealing due to their ability to
impact targets where terrestrial assets are denied access, as well as their importance in shortening
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the F2T2EA cycle. 251 Space weapons could allow for the U.S. to maintain its global strike
capability, even if China successfully employs its A2/AD strategy. This latent capacity would
give the U.S. substantial deterrent capabilities if they retain the ability to target high-value assets,
as well as considerable coercive propensity during a low-grade conflict.
BMD is the final proposed role of space weaponization. Space systems can bolster a
missile defense architecture by producing space-to-atmosphere effects on ballistic missiles, and
by using space-based sensing capabilities to conduct tracking and targeting for ground-based
BMD interceptors. Many Chinese feel that the development of U.S. BMD capabilities is an
intentional first step towards space control. 252 BMD systems can serve the role of ASAT
weapon, interdict an opponent’s direct ascent ASAT weapon, or even intercept an opponent’s
space launch. When a state possesses robust BMD capabilities, they have the potential to destroy
an opponent’s space assets, destroy the ability to counter one’s own space assets, and restrict an
opponent’s access to space, creating an in-atmosphere chokepoint. BMD capabilities are
inherently space control weapons. Therefore, progress by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to
field BMD capabilities, an abundance of American literature on space control via weaponization,
and a renewed emphasis on space warfighting within the U.S. military will result in a strong
counterbalance from China in an attempt to circumvent U.S. space hegemony. 253 China has
repeatedly defended the legal right to conduct warfare in space in response to a threat against its
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sovereignty. 254 The country’s expanding ASAT capabilities (covered in previous sections) will
give teeth to this warning.
Setting aside potential secondary functions, BMD’s primary capability remains ballistic
missile defense. In 2001, the Bush administration withdrew from the 1972 ABM treaty, signed
by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Although China was not party to the treaty and the U.S. was
transparent that its proposed missile defense systems were not aimed at China, the Chinese
staunchly opposed the pullout and suggested that an increase in nuclear arsenal may be
warranted. 255 China viewed the ABM treaty as a cornerstone of its strategic stability. 256 Unlike
the U.S. and Russian principle of mutually assured destruction and concerns of a missile gap
during the Cold War, China believes that a small nuclear arsenal is adequate to field a minimum
deterrent threat. 257 China continues to tout a no first-use commitment, does not have nuclear
weapons on alert, and possesses comparatively few nuclear weapons. It believes that if a small
retaliatory force survives a U.S. or Russian first strike and is able to create only tens of thousands
of casualties for an opponent, enemy loss aversion will create deterrence. 258 Therefore, even a
seemingly small, defensive BMD deployment aimed at “rogue states” could be capable of
destroying China’s small retaliatory force, upsetting Sino-U.S. nuclear deterrence, and leaving
China susceptible to nuclear blackmail. 259 Increasing the capability and scope of the BMD
program could promote a dangerous escalatory dynamic, which may include pressuring China to
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reduce the vulnerability of its arsenal by delegating launch authority, increasing mobility,
increasing the total number of available ICBMs, pursuing advanced reentry vehicle technology,
putting ICBMs on alert, and adopting a limited deterrence posture. 260 There is evidence that
some of these efforts are already underway. 261 Any of these possibilities would have a
counterproductive effect of decreasing nuclear stability. Most dangerously, growing U.S. missile
defense capabilities have forced space war and nuclear deterrence to become increasingly
intertwined in the minds of Chinese strategists. 262
U.S. domination of space is dangerous to China for three reasons. First, it would give the
U.S. military a conventional military advantage in East Asia. This degrades the Chinese deterrent
within the first island chain, strengthening the resolve of a pro-U.S. alliance in the region.
Second, a U.S. space blockade of Chinese space capabilities could be a complimentary step to a
sea-based blockade, disrupting the Chinese economy and giving the U.S. strong coercive power.
Third, a robust BMD program, protected and enhanced by space domination, disrupts the SinoU.S. strategic balance and leaves China susceptible to nuclear blackmail. China may not be able
to dominate space globally, limiting the positive utility of a potential DC outcome. However, a
CD outcome where the United States is able to achieve space domination, rather than space
superiority, would be catastrophic for Chinese sovereignty. China must remain capable of
denying the U.S. space domination, resulting in a strong preference against CD. Alternatively,
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the U.S. has a slightly weaker preference for this outcome. It already enjoys space superiority,
and the marginal benefit between space superiority and space domination is minimal. These
preferences are represented in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: China and the U.S.’s utility given a Cooperate/Cooperate outcome.
e. Analysis
Generally, nuclear weapons do not vary by kind, but by scale. In reality, the menu options
range from large explosion to slightly larger explosion delivered in different ways; any
combination of size and delivery method causes mass casualties. There is a strong moral
compunction against using nuclear weapons, which has resulted in two major thresholds being
formed during the Cold War. The first threshold was the use of nuclear weapons themselves. The
second was their implementation as strategic, rather than tactical, weapons. 263 On the other hand,
ASAT weapons are vastly varied by kind and effect. They range from a possible nuclear
detonation, causing wide scale environmental degradation, to a low-power laser resulting in
temporary effects. Consequently, the ASAT weapon threshold does not hold the same weight as
the nuclear threshold. This threshold was crossed when Chinese and Russian lasers targeted U.S.
satellites and no symmetrical escalation resulted. A threshold for the use of non-reversible effects
could emerge, but this is more likely to be seen as an extension of conventional warfare. 264
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Similar to nuclear weapons, debris causing ASAT events (explored in prior sections) have the
potential to preclude the future use of space and cause strategic damage to all states. As a result,
the most likely firebreak on which a system of mutual restraint could be based on is the debris
causing threshold. Therefore, ASAT weapons can be implemented on both
conventional/operational and strategic levels, depending on their capability to generate debris.
Understanding this dichotomy is essential to analyzing space strategy within a game theoretical
framework. It is represented by two 2x2 matrices in Figure 9. The left matrix represents a
scenario where the threshold of debris causing ASAT events has been crossed, and the right
represents a scenario where non-debris causing ASATs are in play.
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Figure 9: Comparing utility in two scenarios. The 2x2 matrix on the left shows utility when the
debris causing threshold has been crossed. The 2x2 matrix shows utility in a sub-threshold
conflict.
Due to asymmetry in the magnitude of utility, preferences can be represented as ordinal for the
purpose of simplification. A scale of 1-4 shows actor preferences from least strong to most
strong.
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Figure 10: Shows ordinal preferences for both scenarios. Ordinal preference does not represent
the magnitude of actor preferences, but is a better visual representation of the game.
If debris causing ASATs are introduced into the game, the resulting dynamic is one in
which crossing the debris threshold would cause both China and the U.S. to end up with their
worst possible outcome. The space environment faces long-term damage, both countries lose out
on future gains from utilizing space, and their ability to use space support to wage a conventional
war is reduced. However, each side has more to gain by defecting than moving to the globally
optimal solution of mutual cooperation. The choice to develop space control capabilities can give
either player strategic and operational advantages, a benefit neither player is willing to sacrifice.
The first to change its strategy to cooperate, rather than risk the consequences of the annihilation
of space, cedes this advantage to its opponent, essentially losing the game. Each player weighs
the probability and consequences of the catastrophic outcome occurring against the probability of
the other player backing down and gaining advantage. This results in brinksmanship, a race to
establish commitment and credibility in an effort to cause the other to back down. 265 A game
with these characteristics is commonly known as chicken.
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In a struggle for space control without the introduction of debris-causing ASATs, the
worst possible outcome for either side would be getting taken advantage of when choosing to
cooperate, while the other side defects. Mutual cooperation remains the globally optimal solution
and mutual defection remains the global minimum. Similar to a game of chicken, both players
can gain from exploiting the other, more than they can in a cooperative scenario. However, the
dynamic that prevents players from moving to the globally optimal solution is the fear of being
exploited in a Cooperate/Defect scenario, rather than the fear of Defect/Defect resulting in an
environmental catastrophe. Therefore, increasing the value of mutual cooperation and decreasing
the probability of the other side defecting becomes important in order to decrease fear of a
Cooperate/Defect scenario. The game is about establishing trust in order to engender
cooperation, rather than establishing credibility to cause the other side to back down. This is
known as a security dilemma. 266 In a security dilemma, modeled in figure 9, the choice of both
players can be predicted. If China believes that the United States will defect, it must also defect,
lest it be taken advantage of. If China believes that the United States will cooperate, it will also
defect to take advantage of U.S. cooperation. Since this is a symmetric game, the United States’
choices will be the same. Therefore, according to the game theoretical model presented, SinoU.S. space relations are engaged in a downward spiral of arms racing and competition.

C. Testing the zero-sum assumption:
When defining the game in previous chapters, it was assumed that global utility was constant,
resulting in a zero-sum game. In the practical application of game theory, a zero-sum relationship
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is essential to the security dilemma operating as modeled. When one state seeks security, it does
so at the expense of another, driving fear of Cooperate/Defect. However, if a state will not
decrease the security of another by increasing its own, there is no reason to fear
Cooperate/Defect and the security dilemma fails to operate. There are two crucial variables in
determining how strong the zero-sum assumption is (and how strongly the security dilemma
operates): whether defensive weapons and policies can be distinguished from offensive ones, and
whether the offense has the advantage. 267 A combination of these variables creates four worlds in
which the security dilemma operates at different magnitudes.

Offense-Defense
Offense
Advantage

Defense
Advantage

Distinguishable

Doubly dangerous
security dilemma

Security dilemma,
requirements may
be compatible

NotDistinguishable

No security
dilemma, but
aggression
possible

Doubly Stable

Distinguishability

Figure 11: Four worlds created by offense-defense balance and distinguishability, in which the
security dilemma operates at different strengths. 268
f. Offense/Defense Balance:
In order to determine an offense-defense balance, two questions must be asked. The first is
an economic one: is it more cost effective to build offensive or defensive weapons? 269 In this
case, the question can be modified to: is it more cost effective to provide space effects or disrupt
them? Currently, it is much more economically efficient to disrupt space effects for two reasons.
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First, the geography of the space domain makes it favorable to the offense. The high fuel cost
required to significantly alter satellites’ orbits keeps them in relatively stable, predictable orbits
that make tracking and targeting straightforward. 270 China already employs seven ground-based
satellite SLR stations on the Chinese mainland to detect, track, and characterize space objects
with sub centimeter level accuracy. 271 However, they are expanding their space surveillance
efforts with an SLR station in Argentina, the deployment of space surveillance and tracking
ships, and multiple international data sharing agreements. 272 Due to recent, rapid improvements
in SSA capabilities, passive means of defense, such as cover and concealment, have become lost
despite the vastness of space. Furthermore, efficient travel in space requires adherence to
economically favorable lanes of travel, creating strategic chokepoints through which satellites in
any regime must pass. Likewise, there are a limited number of economically advantageous
orbits, allowing space control efforts to be focused at a few central nodes. 273 Defensive
principles, such as defense in depth and extended lines of communication, have weak analogies
in the space environment. Sheer numbers of satellite systems can create defense in depth, but
space is largely absent of the geographic features that would normally be used. These combined
factors make passive defense in the space environment problematic, therefore favoring offensive
tactics.
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Second, the current state of technology favors the offense. Active means of defense add cost
by adding complexity and weight to already expensive satellite systems. Adding fuel in order to
make satellites more maneuverable adds extraneous weight to a system and proportionally
increases launch costs at $20k/kg into LEO. 274 Due to the exponential nature of the rocket
equation, the mass penalty increases rapidly as total ΔV (maneuverability) increases.

Figure 12: The ratio of propellant mass to satellite mass required to produce a given ΔV using
conventional propulsion. 275
Look, shoot, look procedures commonly in practice for DAASAT weapons and the high
maneuverability of co-orbital ASAT systems mean that preparing a satellite to avoid either of
these threats would require it to perform a series of costly maneuvers. This increases on-board
fuel requirements, mass, and ultimately, cost. Additionally, added maneuverability is not an
effective countermeasure against ground-based threats, such as jammers and lasers. Employing
bodyguard satellites may be a solution to protect key systems, but their effectiveness against a
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determined opponent is dubious and adds cost to the system. 276 The same principles hold true for
physical shielding. On the other hand, ASAT systems are smaller, less massive, more
maneuverable, and less complex than the space systems they are designed to defeat. 277 Due to
the fragility of space systems and the massive kinetic energy of a small object traveling at 7,600
m/s, space is a scenario in which a well-aimed brick beats a multimillion-dollar engineering
marvel. Lifting a satellite into orbit is much more demanding than simply lifting an ASAT to
high altitude in order to conduct an attack. 278 Further, the relatively complex, fragile, and
physically long lines of communication on which space systems rely are susceptible to attack via
a multitude of means. 279 When taken together, these factors mean that space disruption is much
more cost effective than constructive use. 280 Therefore, as is true in the current state of
technology, when each dollar spent on offense can overcome each dollar spent on defense, the
players are incentivized to build offensive forces. 281
The second question necessary to determine offense-defense balance is one of military
utility: has first-strike stability been established? When a successful attack will weaken the other
side to the point where victory becomes quick, bloodless, and decisive, this increases the
incentives to strike first and makes establishing first-strike stability difficult. 282 The Chinese
desire to use counterspace assets for the purpose of creating a temporary, localized advantage
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within the East Asian theater (which has already been covered at length) suggests that they are
highly incentivized by the prospect of a first-strike that disrupts U.S. expeditionary capability. 283
In a simple denial of gains versus cost imposition equation, the high value of U.S. space systems,
and the distinct lack of defensive measures to protect them with, means that creating deterrence
through denial of gains is unlikely. Cost imposition strategy has its own set of concerns. First, a
symmetric U.S. deterrent threat has little credibility. Engaging in a tit-for-tat exchange with
ASAT systems is not a credible deterrent because China has more to gain from this strategy. 284
Whereas, an asymmetric attack using conventional forces (for example, an attack on terrestrial
segments of space systems within China) or other domains (nuclear, cyber, terrestrial) risks
horizontal escalation, broadens the scope of conflict, and could allow China to seize the
narrative. 285 Second, remaining U.S. deterrent options lack proportionality. If China applies sublethal counterspace options against the high value of space systems, the gains China reaps from
ASAT attacks will outweigh perceived cost (unless the U.S. threatens a seemingly
disproportionate response). 286 This has created a gap between credible threat and proportionality,
where any U.S. response has either a credibility or proportionality problem, limiting options for
establishing first-strike stability.
g. Dual-Use Problem
The second crucial variable in testing the zero-sum nature of the game is whether defensive
weapons can be distinguished from offensive ones. Offense-defense differentiation alleviates the
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security dilemma by allowing states to act in ways that are clearly defined as offensive or
defensive, bolstering the efficacy of strategic signaling. This is due to three underlying
mechanisms. First, each player can clearly signal that its military capabilities are in line with its
subjective security demands, curtailing the belief that it is expansionist and threatening another
state’s security. Second, when the buildup of offensive forces is obvious, it allows other players
to obtain advance warning of aggression. This advance warning lowers the gains from a surprise
attack and alleviates the fear of being taken advantage of in a Cooperate/Defect scenario. Third,
clear differentiation between offensive and defensive weapons, as well as military and civilian
technologies, allows for clear arms control agreements to be put in place. 287 This dynamic
operates in the traditional sense, where offensive weapons are those used to attack or interdict an
opponent’s military and expand one’s own territory. Therefore, if space systems are used
specifically to disable an opponent’s space systems, prevent it from using the medium, or disrupt
its use of space effect, it can be labeled as offensive. However, some space technologies may be
used for either offensive or defensive purposes. The ubiquity of space effects in military
operations mean that some space systems are inherently neutral but can be treated as offensive or
defensive depending on the terrestrial operations they support. Furthermore, military and civilian
uses of space systems are difficult to differentiate, confounding all three underlying mechanisms.
These factors make offense-defense differentiation extremely difficult, further confounding the
Sino-U.S. security dilemma.
The current state of technology in space is resoundingly unfavorable to offense-defense
differentiation. Many closely related technologies may either serve as ASAT weapons, as
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defensive weapons, or completely benign tools to further the peaceful uses of space. For
example, a satellite with the ability to conduct rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) can
be used as an offensive counterspace weapon to disable an opponent’s satellite systems, conduct
signal jamming, or collect intelligence; it can also be used as a defensive counterspace weapon to
serve as a “host” satellite. Additionally, the satellite may be used for benign purposes, such as
conducting refueling, cleaning up debris, or being used as a technology demonstrator for human
spaceflight missions. 288 It has even been suggested that developing a satellite capable of active
debris cleanup is a method of simultaneously developing ASAT capabilities without arousing
global outcry. 289
China currently operates five technology demonstration programs that further its knowledge
of RPOs. However, it has not conducted a destructive intercept of a target and there is no
definitive proof that these programs have direct counterspace purposes. 290 Western observers
first raised the alarm in 2008, when the BX-1 (hosting a photo imaging payload) was released
from the Shenzhou-7 capsule during a spacewalk. It conducted limited proximity operations
around the capsule, then appeared to maneuver in order to conduct an intentional flyby of ISS. 291
Although further assessment has concluded that the ISS flyby was benign, it has raised concerns
that the test could give China the operational and technical expertise necessary to develop a co-
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orbital ASAT. 292 In 2010, the SJ-12 conducted a series of RPO maneuvers with a target payload
(SJ-06F) culminating in a physical “bump” that caused perturbations in the satellites’ orbits. 293
Chinese media stated that the SJ-12 was “designed for carrying out scientific and technological
experiments including space environment probe, measurement and communications.” 294
However, some American experts believe that its true mission is intelligence collection, while
others view it as a precursor to the first docking of a Shenzhou space capsule with the Tiangong1 space station in the following year. 295 They remain in disagreement as to whether it represents
a significant ASAT capability. 296
The Chinese RPO demonstration that has caused the most consternation among American
observers is a series of maneuvers conducted by the SY-7, CX-3 and SJ-15 satellites, starting in
2013. One of the satellites was equipped with a robotic arm built by the Chinese Academy of
Space Technology (CAST) that was designed to capture a micro target satellite. 297 They
conducted a series of tests over multiple years, which may have resulted in a successful
grapple. 298 It has been suggested that the SY-7’s robotic arm was a predecessor of an arm
destined to be launched aboard China’s large space station (slated for launch in 2020 or beyond),
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a test of space maintenance capabilities, or an experiment on the collection of space debris. 299
Alternatively, Pentagon officials believe that it is a test of China’s secret ASAT program and
represents a real concern for U.S. national defense. 300 This is a case study for the differentiation
problem in space. It was most likely developed to be a stepping stone in the Chinese manned
space program, but was also built by a military contractor with military capabilities also in
mind. 301 Similarly, the Aolong-1 (The Roaming Dragon) was built by CAST and launched in
2016. Its mission is to rendezvous with a “non-cooperative” target to collect man-made debris in
space, but CAST researchers noted that the Chinese military acknowledges its usefulness as an
ASAT technology. 302 However, its purpose as either a weapon, junk collector, or technology
demonstrator for the space station has not been established and remains hotly debated. 303 This
demonstrates that differentiation in space is largely accomplished by examining intent rather than
technological specifications.
The line between offensive and defensive technologies does not get clearer when
comparing BMD and ASAT technologies. From the point of view of arms control and policy,
ASAT technology and BMD are near polar opposites, but technological similarities means that
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BMD and ASAT systems are functionally interchangeable. 304 The United States has
demonstrated the ability to use the SM-3, which is part of the ship mobile Aegis BMD system, to
destroy satellites in LEO. 305 The Ground Based Interceptor system deployed to Alaska and
California have not demonstrated the ability to function as an ASAT system, but the program
could have greater potential as an ASAT system than the SM-3. 306 China’s test of BMD and
ASAT capabilities are also closely linked. The SC-19 System was tested twice before it
intercepted the Chinese FY-1C weather satellite as an ASAT demonstration. 307 The SC-19 (DN01) was tested again in 2010, 2013, 2014, and possibly 2018, with each of these tests involving
the interception of a ballistic missile. 308 Since the debris-creating 2007 ASAT test, which caused
significant public outrage, China has been careful to frame SC-19 testing as peaceful, defensive
BMD tests. 309 The DN-02 and DN-03 variants also intercepted ballistic targets and were framed
as BMD tests, but American officials are adamant that these are continued tests of ASAT
capabilities. 310 Again, due to the difficulty of differentiating BMD from ASAT technology,
American strategists cannot rely on technological nuance to determine if China’s recent tests

304

Ashton Carter, “The Relationship of ASAT and BMD Systems,” Daedalus 114, no. 2 (1985): 173-176.
Brian Weeden, Global Counterspace Capabilities, 3-9.
306
Weeden, 3-10.
307
Gertz, “Going on Defense: China, U.S. Conduct Missile Defense Tests,” Washington Free Beacon, January
27, 2013, https://freebeacon.com/national-security/going-on-defense/.
308
Gertz, “China Tests Anti-Satellite Missile.”
309
Zachary Keck, “China Claims That It Has Tested a Mid-Course Missile Defense System,” The National
Interest, February 11, 2018; https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-claims-it-has-tested-mid-course-missiledefense-system-24434; Timothy Farnsworth, “China Conducts Missile Defense Test,” Arms Control Today,
February 28, 2013, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/China-Conducts-Missile-Defense-Test; Zhang Zhihao,
“China Conducts Missile Interception Test,” China Daily, February 6, 2018,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201802/06/WS5a79570ca3106e7dcc13b193.html; Bill Gertz, “Going on Defense:
China, U.S. Conduct Missile Defense Tests.”
310
Kevin Pollpeter et al., The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force , 9; Gertz, “China Tests AntiSatellite Missile;” Gertz, “China ASAT Test Part of Growing Space War Threat.”
305

89

represent an expansion of offensive or defensive capabilities. Rather, they must surmise Chinese
intent, which is exponentially more difficult.
It is estimated that 95% of space technology has dual use for both civilian and military
purposes. 311 For example, research in rocketry during the Cold War was originally used to
deliver nuclear weapons but became the forbearer of technology that supported the Apollo
program, and more recently allowed middle school students to launch a satellite into a polar
orbit. 312 Very few technologies are inherently military or civilian. Therefore, in the majority of
cases, civilian and military differentiation cannot be accomplished via function alone. This
creates a conundrum where the U.S. is forced to choose between attempting to control all space
technology, lest it be used by China, or maintaining a monopoly on only a small number of
technologies vital to national security. It has continually chosen the former. 313
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Table 2: A more complete list of space technologies with their civilian and military uses. 314
Generic Technology
Application
Communications Satellites

Remote Sensing

Satellite navigation
systems
Rocket Propulsion

Search and Rescue
Systems
Space science and
exploration

Civil Use

Military Use

Dual Use?

Fixed Satellite service
Broadcasting satellite
service
Mobile satellite Service
Land, maritime, and
aeronautical mobile
intersatellite services
Earth resource observations
Environmental monitoring
Atmospheric research
Geophysics
Oceanography
Cartography

Fixed satellite service
Broadcasting satellite
service
Mobile satellite service
Land, maritime, and
aeronautical mobile
intersatellite services
Reconnaissance systems
Environmental Monitoring

Yes
Yes

Treaty compliance
verification
Navigation services
Space launch systems
Propulsion systems
Reaction and control
systems

Interceptor propulsion and
grappling systems
Search and rescue services

Precision targeting
Oceanography
Cartography
Nuclear test detection and
surveillance
Early-warning system
Treaty compliance
verification
Navigation services
Space launch systems
Propulsion Systems
Reaction and control
systems
Ballistic missiles
Anti-ballistic missiles
Interceptor propulsion and
grappling systems
Search and rescue services

General space science
Manned observation and
mission staging

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No

Manned observation and
mission staging

Yes

The registration convention dictates that launched objects are registered with the UN
containing, at a minimum: name of launching state, designator, basic orbital parameters, and
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general function. 315 With this information, it is easy to determine which systems are directly
owned and operated by a state’s military and intelligence apparatus. However, military use of
civilian satellite systems and vice versa confounds even this apparently simple distinction. The
first U.S. PNT system (NAVSTAR) was launched in 1974 with military navigation and nuclear
detection missions, followed by 11 more satellites between 1978 and 1985. However, President
Reagan opened the data for civilian use, ostensibly in reaction to the Russian shoot-down of
Korean Air flight 007. 316 Since that time, PNT has become integrated into the global economy
by providing location based services; enabling navigation for roads, aviation, rails, and maritime
environments; providing precision agriculture and surveying; aiding in construction and mining;
and for precise timing and time synchronization used in broadcasting, mobile phones, and
internet transactions. 317 U.S. economic benefit from NAVSTAR is conservatively estimated at
$68.7B and global economic benefit around $260B. 318 Civilian and military use of PNT is
intertwined to the point where attacks that cause widespread signal degradation could risk
horizontal escalation. Likewise, disabling NAVSTAR for tactical operations risks escalating the
conflict to the strategic level, due to importance of the system to the U.S. economy.
To further complicate the dual use problem, the U.S. DoD has expressed an interest in
hosting military payloads on both commercial and non-U.S. satellites. In 2011, the Air Force
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created the Hosted Payload Office to facilitate matching government payloads with hosts and has
launched three payloads on commercial assets, with more on the way. 319 During the 2018 Space
Symposium, Secretary of the Air Force, Heather Wilson, announced plans to host DoD payloads
on partner nations’ satellites, including Australia, Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, Norway,
and Japan. Secretary Wilson was clear that the intent of the policy was to change the decision
calculus of potential aggressors. 320 Months later, the United States Government Accountability
Office published a report recommending that the DoD continues to pursue hosted payloads in
order to streamline the acquisitions process and provide increased strategic resiliency. 321 The
2018 Joint Chiefs of Staff publication on Space Operations listed utilizing commercial assets to
increase space mission assurance by providing resiliency and diversification from military
owned assets. 322 For that reason, targeting a payload owned and operated by the U.S. military
will increasingly involve attacking commercial and partner nations’ assets by proxy.
Additionally, military organizations buy key services from commercial space providers.
The same Joint Chiefs document listed reliance on commercial space systems for communication
and imagery as a key DoD dependency. 323 Prior to September 11, 2001, DoD satellite
communication (SATCOM) demands were largely filled internally and relied on commercial
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SATCOM for surge capability; however, DoD reliance on commercial SATCOM has increased
800 percent since then. 324 Current estimates are that more than 80% of DoD SATCOM
bandwidth is purchased from commercial companies, with demand continuing to grow and no
military capability slated to fill demand. 325
Commercial remote sensing data is more controversial and more complicated than
commercial communications. The Land-Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984
authorized the Secretary of Commerce to market Landsat data commercially and allowed for the
licensing of private remote-sensing space systems. 326 It was replaced by the Land Remote
Sensing Policy Act of 1992, which added language that requires privately licensed companies to
comply with national security concerns. 327 Since then, multiple high-resolution imagery satellites
have launched under U.S. license, with Digital Globe/GeoEye currently monopolizing the U.S.
market. Due to the classification of DoD imaging satellites, it is difficult to precisely gauge how
reliant the U.S. is on commercial data, though a good indicator is that the U.S. government
accounts for half of GeoEye’s revenue and heavily subsidizes its technology development. 328
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Given this cross-flow of data between DoD, civilian, and private agencies, civilian/military
differentiation by owner is also muddled.
As commercial imaging capabilities continue to improve, they have greater utility in
terms of military intelligence. 329
Table 3: Privately owned, commercially available high and medium resolution imaging satellites
and their capabilities. 330
Country of
Origin

Operator

Name

Panchromatic

United States

DigitalGlobe (US)

Worldview-1

50cm

United States

DigitalGlobe (US)

Worldview-2

46cm

1.84m

United States

DigitalGlobe (US)

Worldview-3

31cm

1.24m

United States

DigitalGlobe (US)

Worldview-4

30cm

United States

DigitalGlobe (US)

GeoEye-1

41cm

1.65m

France

Spot (FR)

50cm

2m

France

Spot (FR)

1.5m

6m

Germany

Planet Labs (US)

Pleiades-1
Pleiades-2
SPOT-6
SPOT-7
RapidEye 1-5

United States

Planet Labs (US)

Dove x88

United States

Planet Labs (US)

SkySat 1-15

72cm

1m

India

21st Century
(PRC) (Future)

TripleSat 1-3

1m

4m

Multispectral

5m
3-5m

329
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Table 4: Resolution needed to observe military targets. 331

331
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The clear overlap between the resolution of commercially available images and the resolution
needed for identification of military targets should be concerning for both players. It provides a
source of high-quality intelligence that may be difficult to interdict for political reasons. The
U.S. government has fought to restrict selling high resolution imaging data, but due to the
proliferation of commercially available data and rapidly increasing capabilities, it has little
choice but to make concessions, lest the U.S. private sector be left behind. 332 For either player to
deny high resolution data to the other, it must mitigate the other’s military collection capability,
as well as its ability to purchase commercially available products; however, this capability is
often provided under the license of third party nations. Again, this increases diplomatic
complexity, limits credible threats, and risks horizontal escalation during a conflict.
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III.

Decisions Under Risk

Thus far, this analysis has exclusively focused on the independent variable of systemic
incentives that face China and the United States. This classical realist’s approach takes into
account only relative material power capabilities and assumes perfect rationality within a state’s
decision making apparatus. These variables set the bounds of state behavior and account for
long-term trends, but their impact on foreign policy in the short and medium term is ultimately
indirect and complex. Rather, systemic pressures and external variables must be translated
through intervening variables at the unit level in order to undertake robust predictive analysis. 333
If statesmen in China and the United States were to correctly identify the structural security
dilemma at play and trust the other to do the same, the dilemma would be relatively easy to
diffuse. In a world with perfect rationality, mutual confidence building initiatives would be
received well and increase the incentive for cooperation. Likewise, a tit-for-tat strategy could
increase the cost of defection without risk of escalation. The zero-sum assumption crumbles
under the belief that the recognition of shared goals and security for all players is not a mutually
exclusive event.
However, decision makers tend to act in terms of the vulnerability they feel, which often
differs from the reality of relative material power dynamics. 334 A state’s subjective security
demands are a compilation of psychological biases, cultural values, and historical factors that can
alter the utility of outcomes described by a realist’s analysis of the security dilemma. 335 A player
will act rationally in the sense that is chooses the course of action that it believe provides the
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greatest payoff. Whether or not their belief is in alignment with the “ideal” depends on how their
perception is affected by motivated and unmotivated biases. 336 This is the basis for the
neoclassical realist assumption of bounded rationality over the realist assumption of perfect
rationality. Therefore, a fundamental question should be: does a perceptual security dilemma
accompany the structural security dilemma?
A series of biases stemming from inherent cognitive fallacies fundamentally alters the
perception of risk, reward, and probability. This leads statesmen to underestimate the extent to
which their actions threaten other states, overestimate the compatibility of their own goals with
an opponent’s goals, and misinterpret signals from an opponent. These misperceptions
exacerbate the problem at the core of the security dilemma: a player believes that the other player
prefers defection, while they themselves are trying to cooperate. 337 Additionally, a series of
biases stemming from a system of beliefs and cultural factors (strategic culture) alters a player’s
perception of utility. 338 Due to the diversity of strategic cultures among the world’s states, player
preferences are likely to diverge from realist predictions that measure relative material power
alone. Therefore, it is imperative to account for cognitive biases and cultural belief systems in
order to determine the extent to which they modify the security dilemma presented in previous
chapters. 339 Furthermore, preconceptions about an opponent limit the imagination and empathy
necessary for the correct appreciation of threats. 340 Conversely, a shared value system (or at least
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cultural understanding) dampens the zero-sum assumption that drives the security dilemma by
causing one player to value the wellbeing of the other. 341

A. China under Prospect Theory
A. Decisions under risk
The primary unmotivated bias that causes players to violate expected utility theory is the
tendency to improperly value outcome while under risk. This is known as prospect theory,
first published in 1979 by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. They found that players
view outcomes in terms of deviation from a reference point, meaning that they perceive
outcomes as gains or losses rather than final states. They demonstrated that players generally
prefer a smaller, but more certain gain when compared to a larger, though less certain gain.
Players will violate expected utility by choosing a non-optimal course of action because they
value certainty, creating a loss aversion when in the domain of gains. However, when
confronted with losses, the outcome is reflected. Players generally prefer to risk a larger, but
uncertain loss when compared to a smaller, but more certain loss. In the domain of losses,
players are violating expected utility because they become risk seeking. A function of value
and gains under perfect rationality is linear. However, loss aversion in the domain of gains
and risk seeking in the domain of losses, combined with the diminishing returns of both gains
and losses as a player gets further away from its reference point, results in convex and
concave regions of a value curve. As a player in the domain of losses moves further from its
reference, it will accept increasingly high amounts of risk for the prospect of a return to the
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reference. Conversely, when a player in the domain of gains moves further from its
reference, they are less likely to accept risk for an identical gain. 342

Figure 13: Value function under prospect theory. 343
In international relations, an actor’s reference point is set at the relative power status they
feel entitled to, which is based on prior standing or aspirational goals. 344 The dissonance
between its reference point and the current status quo will determine whether it is operating
in a domain of gains or domain of losses. If an actor is satisfied with the status quo, it will be
in the domain of gains. A state in the domain of gains forgoes the opportunity to improve its
position (which would entail accepting additional risk), opting for the certainty of the status
quo. If a state is dissatisfied with the status quo, it will be in the domain of losses. A state in
the domain of losses will accept additional risk in order to improve its relative position,
rather than accept the unfavorable status quo. 345 As a result, the security dilemma is
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heightened when one or both states are in the domain of losses but dampened when both are
in a domain of gains.
When structural asymmetry exists (one player being in a domain of gains and the other in
a domain of losses), it results in a fundamentally unstable relationship that creates a security
dilemma. 346 The dilemma can be exacerbated when there is dissonance between the structural
realities of relative power and the perception of one’s rightful place within the international
system. The rising power believes that its newly found (or rediscovered) material power
entitles it to an increased place in the international system. It is in the domain of losses
seeking gains. The status quo power is hesitant to relinquish the hegemonic position and
demands respect from the rising power. It is operating in the domain of gains, seeking
stability. The slowly changing international system cannot incorporate the rising power into
its schema rapidly enough, resulting in war between the status quo and rising power. This
interplay between the structural factors of security dilemma and the psychological factors of
prospect theory has been termed “Thucydidess’ Trap”. 347 In the last 500 years, the
international system has been subjected to the dynamics of Thucidides’s Trap 16 times; 12 of
those incidents have resulted in a war between major powers. 348
Applying prospect theory to the Sino-U.S. security dilemma has worrying consequences
if China is in a domain of losses and the United States is in a domain of gains. This results in
a very important dynamic: under prospect theory, China is incentivized to upset the status
quo, while the U.S. is incentivized to maintain it. This amplifies the outcomes of a scenario
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where China defects and the U.S. cooperates. The security dilemma is deepened because the
benefits of defection are more attractive for China and U.S. losses are exaggerated. At the
same time, China’s benefit from cooperation is decreased because it has little to gain from
maintaining its current position. In all cases, China’s incentives to defect are increased.

C

Without Prospect
Theory

With Prospect
Theory

China

China

C

D

6,3

-5,8

U.S.

C

D

C

8,1

-7,10

D

6,-6

-5, 0

U.S.
D

8, -10

-3,-1

Figure 14 Game under prospect theory. Prospect theory strengthens the structural security
dilemma observed in Chapter II.
B. China and the “Century of Humiliation”
China has existed for millennia, less as a nation-state and more of a permanent natural
phenomenon whose protected geography and unique cultural unity have resulted in a nearly
continuous existence in unification. Throughout the long existence of this geographic entity,
periods of disunity and turmoil were treated as an aberration. 349 Although external threats were
present throughout China’s history, its ability to deflect, absorb, or conquer barbarians while
simultaneously maintaining unity created China’s identity as an enduring, universal entity. 350
This idea, combined with its historical economic preeminence, led to the belief in China’s
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centrality. China was not a civilization; it is civilization, the “Middle Kingdom” with all other
societies assessed as graduations from it. 351
It is unsurprising that Confucianism took root in this environment. Confucianism is a
conservative philosophy that values recognition of hierarchy, social harmony and internal
stability, observation of “correct” conduct, and a desire for isolation. 352 The Confucian
philosophy is evident in Chinese diplomatic relations. China rarely engaged in balance of power
diplomacy because it viewed itself as the Central Kingdom, dominating All Under Heaven. Due
to this centrality, it was not required to deal with other states on the basis of equality due to its
hegemonic position in East Asia. 353 Furthermore, Confucianism has pervaded all aspects of
Chinese culture and is not conducive to democratic rule. 354 Rather, the sovereign possesses the
“Mandate of Heaven”, lost only if it shows signs of weakness and is usurped by a stronger ruler,
who would then possess the same mandate. 355 Through periods of isolation, political turmoil, and
chaos, the state ultimately survives and returns to equilibrium. The Cultural Revolution under
Mao sought to destroy China’s Confucian tradition; but today China remains Maoist in name
only, while Confucian tradition is resurgent.
He [Mao] was passionately and publicly anti-Confusion, yet he read widely in Chinese
classics and was wont to quote from the ancient texts…Maoist governance thus turned into a
version of the Confucian tradition through the looking glass, proclaiming a total break with
the past while relying on many of China’s traditional institutions, including an imperial style
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of governance; the state as an ethical project; and a mandarin bureaucracy that Mao loathed,
periodically destroyed, and in the end, equally periodically was obliged to re-create. 356
The latest era of turmoil and uncertainty began with The First Opium War. It ushered in a
110 year era between 1839 and 1949 where Western military and diplomatic advantage allowed
for unprecedented imperialist intervention in China, known as the “century of humiliation”.
Military superiority allowed Western diplomats to impose a series of unequal trade agreements,
resulting in the opening of Chinese markets to foreign trade. These treaties contradicted the idea
that China was the Central Kingdom and all other states are tributaries within China’s sphere of
influence. Furthermore, foreign intervention led to the erosion of Chinese territorial integrity.
Treaties with Western nations forced cession of a number of territories, including Hong Kong;
Japanese military invasion led to China losing control over parts of Manchuria and Taiwan; and
independence movements in Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang led to further reductions in China’s
territory. Additionally, this era was punctuated with severe internal turmoil that destroyed the
traditional imperial government and killed millions. 357 Western imperialism in China was not
focused on territorial conquest, nor did it seek to administer Chinese territory, but it did force
China to accept a world order fundamentally incompatible with its existing one. 358 China was no
longer the Middle Kingdom, but a tributary of the West. During the century of humiliation,
China became far removed from its historic reference point as the Middle Kingdom.
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The Century of Humiliation ended with national unification under Mao. Since then,
China’s economy has experienced massive growth, surpassing the U.S. as the world’s largest
economy by many metrics. 359 Despite this meteoric return to economic preeminence and an
apparently stable internal hierarchy, China remains far from this historical reference point. The
legacy from the Century of Humiliation remains deeply ingrained in the Chinese consciousness:
“China is often portrayed as having suffered three kinds of loss during the Century of
Humiliation: a loss of territory; a loss of control over its internal and external environment; and a
loss of international standing and dignity. Each of these represents an injustice to be rectified.” 360
CCP leaders are aware of China’s tenuous internal balance and capacity for swift and radical
change. 361 Thus, rectifying these injustices, along with continuing economic prosperity, remains
at the core of the CCP’s social contract. 362 The CCP has portrayed itself as the protector of China
against Western interference and the driver of its economic success. 363 A new nationalist
narrative (driven by the Central Propaganda Department) has emerged that is less about
celebrating China’s strength than commemorating its weakness; it is based in restoring China as
a nation worthy of the designator “Middle Kingdom” and reclaiming the rightful place of China
in the international system. 364 For this reason, China can be said to operate in a domain of losses
seeking gains.
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C. Chinese Space Program and Techno-nationalism
Although utilization of the space domain is a recent phenomenon when compared to the
ancient Chinese empire, this does not preclude Sino-U.S. space competition from the tenants of
prospect theory. Rather, similar patterns can be identified in Sino-U.S. space relations because it
is an essential marker of national technological, economic, and military capabilities. Not only
does a vibrant space program yield significant material advantage, it demonstrates a nation’s
ability to mobilize its science and technology infrastructure for a unified purpose and advances a
clear nationalist narrative. 365 A 2016 white paper on China’s space activities stated that a
cornerstone of Chinese space policy was “to provide strong support for the realization of the
Chinese Dream of the renewal of the Chinese nation.” 366 Not only is the development of China
linked to that of its space program, China aims to become a space power that can compete with
the United States and Russia. In his 2016 Space Dream speech, president Xi Jinping expressed
that China aspires to become a space giant, an aerospace power. 367 There is good evidence that
China is using the development of its space program to rectify its losses during the Century of
Humiliation. 368 Although Chinese scientists and bureaucrats may not be in agreement as to the
primary goal of the program, they agree that all three losses are addressed by the Chinese space
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program. 369 First, China’s civilian space program is a powerful soft power tool used to improve
its international standing. Second, China’s ambitious space exploration plans can be related to its
expansionism, territoriality and resource nationalism in the terrestrial domain. Third, ambitious
space exploration achievements would give China legitimacy to reshape international norms.
Fourth, the focus on space weapons development may be an attempt to generate a RMA to upset
the status quo of U.S. military superiority.
a. Spaceflight and National Prestige
Although many milestones of the Chinese space program were first accomplished by the
U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War, China has adopted a series of ambitious space
policy objectives designed to prove that China is Asia’s science and technology leader, and that
they are able to compete on the international stage. 370 In particular, China is pursuing manned
spaceflight milestones as an instrument of soft power. These profoundly public demonstrations
are valuable in terms of displaying regional leadership, improving China’s reputation in the field
of high technologies, and attracting young engineering talent. 371 China’s civilian space program
has two notable advantages. First, it spends $2-3 billion annually (0.05% of GDP), compared to
NASA’s yearly budget of $19 million (0.10% of GDP). 372 The notable spending indicates that
China’s accomplishments have occurred at a discounted rate and, as long as China’s economy
continues to grow, budgets have room to expand as well. Second, due to the continuity of CCP
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leadership, China is able to utilize consistent policy, long-term planning, and incremental
development, which are requisite for a successful space program. 373
The power of incrementalism has been evident in the last decade as each major milestone
has served as a building block for the program. The first Chinese astronaut was launched in 2003
aboard the Shenzhou-5 (manned crew capsule). The nation’s first spacewalk occurred in 2008
aboard the Shenzhou-7. In 2012, the Shenzhou-9 docked with the Tiangong-1 (prototype space
station) in order to demonstrate docking/undocking capability requisite for shuttling crews to and
from a space station. 374 October 2016 witnessed the docking of the Shenzhou-11 and the
Tiangong-2, followed by a 30 day stay by Chinese astronauts that demonstrated the ability to
assemble a station and support continual habitation that is projected to begin in 2022. 375 China’s
5 year goals outlined in the 2016 space white paper have been mostly achieved. The Tianzhou-1
(automated resupply capsule) conducted a series of tests with the Tiangong-2 that demonstrated
the ability to resupply astronauts during their stay. 376 However, the rocky development of a
heavy launch capability may postpone the entire deep space exploration, interplanetary, and
manned spaceflight programs. An initial flight of the Long March 5 (heavy launch vehicle) in
November 2016 was successful, but was followed by a notable setback when a July 2017 launch
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experienced a first stage failure. 377 The success of the return-to-flight scheduled for 2019 will
likely determine the timelines for a mission to Mars originally scheduled for 2020, a lunar
sample return mission slated for 2019, and the assembly of the Chinese space station. 378 It may
also determine the fate of the Long March 9 (Saturn V class booster), which is planned to
conduct Martian sample return missions, manned lunar landings, and support the space solar
power program. 379
The relentless forward progress of the Chinese civilian space program demonstrates the
dedication of CCP leadership to the program thus far. Watching their reaction to inevitable
failures and delays in the program will be essential in gauging long-term dedication to competing
with the U.S. It is clear that if CCP leadership maintains the prioritization of these programs
through inevitable technical failures, cost overruns, and periods of economic uncertainty, they
may very well supplant the United States as the world’s premier space power. 380 U.S. policy
makers should take Chinese timelines seriously, as well as gauge their geoeconomic
ramifications, considering the consistency with which the Chinese space program has met its
stated goals over the last half century. 381
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b. Resource Nationalism
Resource nationalism is a state-led effort to exhibit mercantile control of natural
resources through export restrictions, extraction control, taxation, and resource exploration, with
the expressed intent of benefiting one’s own geoeconomic position. This is broadly brought
about by increased resource demand caused by growing populations and industries, uneven
distribution of resources, and an uncertain global trade environment. 382 Being the largest mining
economy in the world, China has had the opportunity to engage in resource nationalism through
targeted export restriction and heavy resource extraction in the Tibetan region. 383 China’s
expanded resource extraction efforts in the South China Sea go hand-in-hand with its claims of
national sovereignty in the region. 384 Apart from its sovereignty claims, China has been
aggressively exploring the international resource extraction market, with emphasis on Africa,
South America, and the Arctic. 385 Given China’s assertive behavior with regard to “lost
territories,” intertwined with the idea of national resources, it is possible that China’s quest for
space-based resources would be informed by a similar logic. 386
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With recent advances in space technology, space may be the next location of a resource
scramble. 387 Given heavy initial investment and two decades to establish an asteroid mining
infrastructure, it is possible to make a very lucrative profit and significantly impact the world’s
supply of platinum group metals (PGMs). This is of significant note as earth-based resources
become increasingly scarce. 388 Effective space mining operations from even a single asteroid
could have disruptive effects on the global iron, nickel, PGM, and precious metal economies,
especially if that supply is controlled by a single state. 389 A small bastion of China experts
believe that its exploration and exploitation of space will mirror its resource extraction initiatives
on earth, that current space science efforts are heavily biased towards exploring and exploiting
natural resources in near earth objects and the moon. 390 They argue the manned space program is
building towards a permanent presence on the moon, which would serve as a focal point for the
expansion of resource extraction efforts.

391

Mining the moon itself is unlikely to prove

profitable. 392 However, given a large scale operation, in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) from the
moon can significantly reduce the cost of asteroid mining efforts in the long term through
propellant synthesis. 393 Additionally, the utilization of lunar ISRU could be a viable (even cost
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saving) alternative to NASA’s Human Exploration of Mars Design Reference Architecture for
manned lunar expeditions. 394
The Chinese lunar program (Chang’e) has made great progress in the last decade. The
Chang’e-2, launched in October 2010, conducted a flyby of an asteroid and surveyed the lunar
surface for future missions. 395 In 2013 the Chang’e-3 was the first spacecraft since the Soviet
Luna-24 mission in 1976 to conduct a soft landing on the moon. Although the lunar rover was
only partially successful, it was a significant step in the Chinese lunar program. 396 The program
matched its goal of landing the Chang’e 4 lunar probe on the far side of the moon, which was
outlined in the 2016 white paper. 397 This success prompted the revelation of a more ambitious
plan to launch at least four additional lunar probes, plans for the construction of a moon base,
and confirmation that the projected 2020 Mars probe was still on schedule. 398 Ye Peijian, chief
commander and designer of China’s lunar exploration program, announced plans to capture an
asteroid and bring it into lunar orbit by 2020 with the expressed intent of mining. 399 Establishing
a lunar base, mining asteroids, and establishing a presence on Mars are three simultaneous,
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interrelated lines of effort; therefore, it remains to be seen whether China’s lunar focus is a base
for resource nationalism, a jumping off point for more prestige oriented missions to Mars, or
both. However, both are consistent with the risky, speculative, but high payoff projects expected
of a power that is in the domain of losses seeking gains.
c. The New Space Law Régime
Compared with economic and military heft, institutional power takes time to
cultivate. As China produces ever more scientists, academics, and professionals who
operate at the cutting edge of their fields, increasing numbers of these individuals will
take on positions of influence in institutions around the world and even create institutions
of their own. China’s ability to influence the regional and global discourse on a wide
range of issues will increase correspondingly. In areas like cyber and space, where
international norms have yet to be settled upon, this growth in institutional soft power
will be particularly valuable. 400
This is especially true concerning space law and policy, whose development was essentially a
continuation of U.S. Cold War strategy. The space law régime maintained the delicate balance of
power between the Soviet Union and the United States, allowing for the seamless incorporation
of another competitive domain into the context of great power competition. Therefore, U.S.
space strategy was aimed at the establishment of a legal regime that complemented the American
propaganda line of openness and cooperation. It simultaneously preserved American freedom to
pursue military missions in space that were needed to protect and perfect the nuclear deterrent. 401
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The use of the word “peaceful” rather than “nonmilitary” allowed for widespread use of military
space assets, which was essential for maintaining the deterrent balance during the Cold War. 402
The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) became dominated by the U.S.
and Soviet Union, and has been effective in keeping the space law régime favorable to the major
powers. 403 The initial development of space law was not intended to be a boon for collective
humanity, rather it began as an instrument for great powers to maintain the global status quo.
Although China has recently acquired the means to compete with the United States and Russia as
a great spacefaring power, there are vestiges in current international law that run counter to
China’s interest. This may not have been the case if China had been given a stake in its
development. 404 The debate over the concept of res communis in space law is an example of the
consternation this has caused between less developed countries and the major spacefaring powers
(i.e. the United States and Soviet Union). 405 Recent technological advancement and a changing
geopolitical environment has led to debate about the fundamental soundness of the OST. 406
In addition to China having very little say in the current space law régime, it has also
been isolated by U.S. space policy. The perception that China intends to use space technology
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largely for military purposes has undermined its reputation and role as a responsible space actor
in the international community. Its reputation is largely responsible for a series of export control
measures by the United States that have resulted in a bottleneck in China’s efforts to expand its
space cooperation. 407 The first major blow to cooperative efforts between China and the U.S.
occurred in the reactionary wake of the factually dubious 1999 Cox Committee Report and the
1998 Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. 408
This effort has resulted in China developing indigenous technologies, creating a market for ITAR
free products, and creating a new generation of Chinese intellectuals resentful and suspicious of
the U.S. 409 However, bilateral efforts were beginning to produce civilian space cooperation until
2011, when a House bill prevented congressionally appropriated funds from being used by
NASA or the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy “to develop, design, plan,
promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to
participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China”. 410 This rendered SinoU.S. cooperation essentially nonexistent and eliminated the possibility of Chinese participation
with the ISS program, which they would have readily accepted. 411
That being said, China’s own policy decisions are mixed in regards to international
cooperation. China’s 2007 DAASAT test either indicated that it does not fundamentally
understand the risk that kinetic ASAT weapons pose to the continued use of space, that it simply

407

Xiaodan Wu, “China and Space Security: How to Bridge the Gap Between its Stated and Perceived
Intentions,” Space Policy Journal 33, no 1 (2015): 21.
408
Joan Johnson –Freese, “China’s Space Ambitions: It’s Not All About the U.S.,” Georgetown Journal of
International Affairs 15, no. 1 (2014): 142-143.
409
Gregory Kulacki, “US and China Need Contact, Not Cold War,” Nature 474 (2011): 444-445.
410
Kulacki, 444.
411
Kobie, “The Epic Tale of China’s Out of this World Plan for Space Domination”; Wu, “China and Space
Security,” 28.

116

did not care about the risk to the space domain, or that the civilian leadership is disconnected
from PLA decision making. The inconsistency and opaqueness of China’s space policy decision
making stymies international outreach. Furthermore, military control of civilian space program is
problematic for China’s space science community when it seeks to build lasting relationships
with other spacefaring nations. These factors make China a difficult target for transparency and
confidence-building measures (TCBMs) that could set the basis for a mutually beneficial space
law régime. Also, China has arguably violated the spirit of the OST with its 2006 lasing of a
NRO payload or its 2007 ASAT test. Therefore, any concessions that the U.S. makes while
renegotiating its space policy with regards to China should seek to increase China’s
transparency, reduce the role of the PLA in its civilian space program, and ensure noninterference with U.S. space assets.
At the same time, China has demonstrated that it is willing to work within the framework
of the existing international space law regime and utilize established methods of introducing and
changing international space law. The development of Chinese domestic space law looks
towards international law and the law of other states (the United States particularly) for
precedent. 412 China has sought an active role in the international space community. Its 2016
white paper stated the desire for cooperation and peaceful development and it has been an
important participant in the UNCOPUOS and the Conference on Disarmament (CD). 413 China
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and Russia jointly submitted the Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in
Outer Space and of the Threat of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) to bring the letter
of international law more in line with the spirit of the OST. 414 The PPWT failed to garner U.S.
support because it did not ban ground-based ASATs, which led to concern that it was a method
for China and Russia to gain military advantage over the U.S. 415 Although this effort failed, it
served to revive the debate about a treaty on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
(PAROS) and serves as an example of China working within the current space law régime to
achieve policy goals. 416 Although the purpose of the PPWT was to paint China and Russia in a
positive light and highlight the U.S.’s militarization of space, the fact that China introduced the
legislation through the established legal framework rather than taking unilateral or bilateral
action is significant.
China’s willingness to interact with the current space law régime can be attributed to the
regime’s weakness, rather than its representativeness of China’s interests. The most important
ramification of the weak space law régime is the opportunity for China to set customary
international law or, at the very least, guide the interpretation of existing law as it is applied to
new space exploration milestones. The prevailing interpretation of the OST has defined the
ambiguous “peaceful purposes” to mean non-aggression rather than non-militarization. This has
resulted in the United States gaining military freedom of action in the domain and has raised
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worries about the U.S.’s desire to dominate space through weaponization. 417 Similarly,
international law is notably ambiguous and open to interpretation concerning space mining and
resource utilization.418 This represents an opportunity to work within the current system to
produce an outcome consistent with China’s long-term goals. 419 Due to the rapid technological
advancements in space, the codified space law régime often does not adapt to keep pace with
international practices; rather, established practices often precede and inform the creation of
international law. 420 China has the opportunity to shape international space law if it can jump to
the forefront of space exploration, particularly if it is able to be the first to conduct ISRU or
space mining. Considering this, a space race may be less about prestige and more about
reshaping international space law, an undeniably appealing prospect to a nation in the domain of
losses.
d. Space Weapons for a Revolution in Military Affairs
RMAs occur when a transformational technology accompanied by sound tactics,
organization, strategy, leadership, training, and national infrastructure produces an innovative
warfighting approach that has a disruptive effect on the current military paradigm. 421
Revolutionary organizations and weapons that have low financial/high organizational cost are

417

Blair Kuplic, “The Weaponization of Outer Space: Preventing and Extraterrestrial Arms Race,” North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 39, no. 4 (Summer 2014), 1144-1152.
418
Virginie Blanchette-Seguin, “Reaching for the Moon: Mining in Outer Space,” Journal of International Law
and Politics 49 (2017): 959-969; Scot Anderson, Korey Christensen, and Julia La Manna, “The Development of
Natural Resources in Outer Space,” Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (2018): 12-15.
419
Liu Hao and Fabio Tronchetti, “Should the Red Dragon Arise? Assessing Chinas Options Vis-à-vis the
Enactment of a Domestic Space Resource Utilization Law,” Space Policy 39-40, May 2017 (2017): 10.
420
Vladlen Vereshchetin and Gennady Danilenko, “Custom as a Source of International Law of Outer Space,”
Journal of Space Law 22 (1985): 31-35.
421
Max Boot, War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Moddern World (New York: Gotham
Books, 2006), 7-16.

119

particularly dangerous to the existing status quo. 422 The PLA was profoundly impacted by the
U.S. military’s integration of information systems to produce battlefield effects, starting with the
Gulf War. The common consensus was that the U.S. had ushered in a RMA that could not be
ignored when building a 21st century military. 423 Luckily for China, these paradigm shifting
observations came at a time when the PLA was beginning rapid military modernization and
revitalization enabled by massive economic growth. The PLA officers overseeing this transition
witnessed the late-20th century American military at its most effective during a critical point of
their professional development. These officers realized that a facsimile of the American way of
war was untenable. Rather, they are developing weapons, organizations, and doctrine that seek to
avoid American shortcomings and adapt Chinese strategic culture for information warfare. 424
Therefore, the threat that China may pose to American military superiority lies not in replication
of currently employed tactics, but in their disruption. Chinese military doctrine designed to
produce this disruption is focused on system-versus-system warfare in multiple domains. Its goal
is to wage decisive, preemptive war using asymmetric weapons to attack enemy information
systems in order to create a temporary, localized advantage, enabling the accomplishment of
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political objectives. The implementation of sophisticated, high-tech space weapons and evolved
space doctrine are a large piece of fighting an informationalized war. 425
A white paper on China’s Military Strategy, published in 2015, was prefaced by the
importance of RMA.
The world RMA is proceeding to a new stage. Long-range, precise, smart, stealthy and
unmanned weapons and equipment are becoming increasingly sophisticated. Outer space
and cyber space have become new commanding heights in strategic competition among
all parties. The form of war is accelerating its evolution to informationization. World
major powers are actively adjusting their national security strategies and defense policies,
and speeding up their military transformation and force restructuring. The
aforementioned revolutionary changes in military technologies and the form of war have
not only had a significant impact on the international political and military landscapes,
but also posed new and severe challenges to China’s military security. 426
The white paper calls for a logistics modernization in order to mobilize national resources,
development of innovative weapons through thorough civil-military integration, reformed
training of military personnel, and the development of doctrine and strategy that focuses on a
dynamic operating environment and capability integration. 427 These are all key ingredients of a
RMA. China has sought to make organizational changes in order to support this military
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strategy; shortly after the 2015 white paper was published, a major organizational restructuring
took place within the PLA. 428 As a part of this restructuring, the Strategic Support Force (SSF)
was created, a force which has no analog in the U.S. Military. Rather, it combines space,
cyberspace, psychological, and electronic warfare into a unified force that conducts technology
development, recruitment, and training for all three mission areas. 429 This reorganization enables
the doctrine of system-versus-system warfare and is consistent with an active defense strategy. 430
Overall, the SSF represents a revolutionary reorganization that could produce a significant
disruption, but whose efficacy has yet to be tested.

B. Availability
During the decision making process, humans engage in shortcuts, judgements, and
substitutions (known as heuristics) in order to simplify complex systems. Using heuristics leads
to systematic errors, which in turn create biases. 431 One bias observed under prospect theory is
the tendency to overestimate small probabilities, which leads to overweighting the effect of rare
events in decision making. 432 Kahneman and Tversky suggest that the major mechanism at fault
for this bias is the availability heuristic. 433 This heuristic relies on human beings estimating the
frequency of an event based on the ease with which similar events may be recalled. Events that
are easy to construct or imagine will be perceived as occurring more frequently than those that
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are more difficult to recall. 434 Therefore, events with high emotional intensity, or whose memory
is recalled with high frequency of repetition, become more available, resulting in an
overestimation of the probability of their occurrence. An American policy maker whose
academic education included frequent exposure to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and who
can vividly recall Al-Qaeda’s attacks on September 11, 2001, may be prone to overestimating the
frequency of these kind of catastrophic events. 435
Likewise, associative strength within a class of events can alter the judgement of an event’s
frequency. When similarity exists between a highly available event in the past and a case under
current consideration, there is a tendency to correlate the events. This leads to the expectation
that what has happened in the past will reoccur. 436 In addition to frequency or intensity of recall,
availability is increased when associative bonds are formed between two events. For example,
9/11 and Pearl Harbor are naturally simplified and grouped together despite significant
differences. This leads to an increased likelihood that current conditions will be judged as a
precursor to this class of event. When policy makers ignore the actual probability of an event
occurring (base rate) due to heuristics, they are likely to judge others as having intentions that are
rare or anticipate events that are very unlikely. 437 In turn, they are likely to take measures (buy
insurance) to reduce the probability that an undesirable event will occur. 438 This can take the
form of a buildup in latent military capability or forming alliances, which often have a
paradoxical effect.
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The United States is aware of the disruption that a new way of fighting war in space could
bring; it is painfully aware of its reliance on space and the vulnerability that creates. A milestone
Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and
Organization (often known as the Rumsfeld Commission) makes five key assessments that have
been largely influential on U.S. policy makers. First, space security should be a top national
security priority due to the U.S. vulnerability in the domain. Second, a reorganization of space
forces is required in order to keep up with evolving security demands. Third, military and
intelligence infrastructures need to increase synergy. Fourth, conflict in the space domain is
coming and the U.S. needs to be prepared. Fifth, revolutionary technologies are needed to
maintain superiority in the domain. 439 The commission recommends salient and relevant
reorganization within the U.S. policy and military infrastructures, similar to the lines of effort
China has undertaken with respect to RMA in the last two decades.
The report embodies the U.S.’s hyperawareness to vulnerability when discussing that, “The
U.S. is an attractive candidate for a ‘Space Pearl Harbor’” and names China explicitly as a
candidate for carrying out such an attack. 440 The provocatively phrased warning was quickly
embraced by U.S. decision makers. The language of “space Pearl Harbor” to describe a
catastrophic attack on U.S. capabilities has often been evoked by politicians, military leaders,
and strategists since many in military leadership take a “when, not if” approach to space
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warfare. 441 This is relevant, less because it exposes American vulnerability, but more because it
demonstrates that U.S. policy makers are affected by prospect theory via the availability
heuristic. The idea of a catastrophic surprise attack that threatens U.S. strategic interests is highly
available to policy makers. They have categorized a prospective Chinese attack on U.S. space
assets with 9/11 and Pearl Harbor, increasing their estimation that such an attack will occur due
to representative association. The recent emphasis on space warfighting in U.S. policy circles
serves the purpose of taking out probabilistic insurance aimed at reducing the probability of
space war occurring or diminishing the effect if it does. 442 Although Russia’s counterspace
capability is arguably more robust than that of China, Russia is less often the target of alarmist
thinking. 443 This is due to three key aspects of Sino-U.S. relations that increase the availability of
an adversarial relationship between China and the United States.
e. Preemption Meets Deterrence
Players primarily hypothesize their adversary’s course of action from history, anticipating
that an opponent will follow a similar strategy to one they have implemented in the past. 444
Unfortunately, historical Sino-U.S. relations are fraught with misunderstanding and conflict.
Fluctuating American power in the Pacific, due to economic cycles and other security
commitments, has repeatedly resulted in China expressing self-determinism and expanded
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sovereignty by testing American resolve. This is demonstrated by multiple Taiwan Strait crises
and continual diplomatic rebalancing among China, Russia, and the United States. 445 Recent
Chinese rapprochement with Russia, as well as Chinese expansion in the East and South China
Seas in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, gives the impression of this same pattern
reemerging. China’s recent expansion in counterspace capabilities could be perceived as a part of
a broader pushback against American hegemony, especially considering how integral space
capabilities are to a regional conflict in East Asia.
Similarly, Western intervention in Asia has repeatedly been met with unexpected hostility
from China due to its fear of encirclement.
When the Chinese view of preemption encounters the Western concept of deterrence, a
vicious circle can result; acts conceived as defensive in China may be treated as
aggressive by the outside world; deterrent moves by the West may be interpreted in
China as encirclement. The United States and China wrestled with this dilemma
repeatedly during the Cold War; to some extent they have not yet found a way to
transcend it… [In the case of Korea] a Chinese offensive was a preemptive strategy
against dangers that had not yet materialized and based on judgements about ultimate
American purposes toward China that were misapprehended. 446
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The assertion of American space superiority and the capability to deny China access to the
domain can be seen as yet another aspect of strategic encirclement. This pattern makes it difficult
to expect peaceful outcomes. Resentment of American bullying has led for some in China to call
for it to consolidate gains and assert a claim to superpower status. On the other hand,
misunderstanding of China’s active defense posture has strengthened the view within American
policy circles that Sino-U.S. relations are zero-sum. 447
h. Cultural Differences
War has a tendency to become ritualized when opponents share a common culture and/or
civilization and are highly invested in international norms. The result is adequate signaling
before an attack occurs, strict rules of engagement, and tactics that reduce collateral damage. 448
During the Cold War, strategic warfare between the U.S. and Russia became ritualized due to
repeated crisis and diplomatic interaction. A system of mutual restraint in space emerged because
space capabilities were inherently linked to treaty verification and early warning. However, due
to conventional-strategic decoupling, no first-strike nuclear posture, and lack of firebreaks, no
such system has emerged between China and the U.S. 449 Disparate views on strategic deterrence
and China’s unwillingness to conform to normative behavior further solidified the divide. As
Mao famously stated “I’m not afraid of nuclear war. There are 2.7 billion people in the world; it
doesn’t matter if some are killed. China has a population of 600 million; even if half of them are
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killed, there are still 300 million people left.” 450 Or, “If the worst came to the worst and half of
mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and
the whole world would become socialist; in a number of years there would be 2.7 billion people
again and definitely more.” 451 This sharply juxtaposes the nuclear taboo that developed between
the U.S. and Soviet Union.
i. Preconceptions
Third, preconceptions limit imagination and empathy in ways that distort perception of
threat. Unfortunately, preconceptions are generally oversimplified or overgeneralized lessons
learned from a biased history. 452 These lessons are cemented in an individual or collective
conscious through confirmation bias. 453 Therefore, cultural narrative is likely to alter threat
perception by shaping availability. Strategic culture is the shared, culturally embedded social,
economic, and political values and priorities of a society, relevant to security preferences, as
historically shaped by successful interactions with and adaptations to their prevailing biophysical and strategic environment. 454 Americans tend to view war in terms of crusades, fought
on behalf of truth, justice, and the American way (democracy, freedom of the seas, and selfdetermination); they fight wars for ideals rather than for an objective. 455 Therefore, the goal for
warfare tends to be the unconditional surrender and the overthrow of the adversary’s system of
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government. 456 This requires the overwhelming use of force and advanced technology to bring
about swift and decisive victory. 457 It inherently demands a worthy foe who deserves U.S.
attention.
The ideological roots of the United States’ China policy are firmly grounded in its vestigial
understanding of China as a Communist threat from the Cold War era. American strategic
interactions with China are often framed by China’s human rights record, domestic reform, and
even régime change, especially in the wake of Tiananmen. 458 Mistrust and suspicion
characterizes American’s view of China, believing that the emergence of China may be a threat
to world peace. 459 This increases the availability of a Chinese challenge to the status quo;
potentially causing U.S. policy makers to overestimate the risk of a Chinese challenge to
American hegemony and/or misinterpreting Chinese signaling. The opaqueness of China’s
decision-making apparatus and apparent internal debate as to what role China desires to play in
the world further convolutes this dynamic.
Why does it matter if scenarios involving an opponent’s defection are highly available? Fear
and mistrust brought on by high availability of a catastrophic Cooperate/Defect scenario lead
players to “buy” probabilistic insurance through increased readiness posture, the formation of
alliances, and arms buildups. This, in turn, increases tension between the players, making it more
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difficult to build trust and see gains from mutual cooperation. Policy makers’ biases involving
the other player’s hostile intentions are confirmed, further entrenching them in the decisionmaking apparatus. This mechanism acts strongly in an offensive dominant environment. 460 The
players become trapped in the cyclical pattern of the security dilemma. In current Sino-U.S.
relations, the danger of this self-fulfilling prophesy is exceptionally high due to the attention that
Chinese policy makers pay to American doctrine, literature, and policy. This is especially true
when U.S. policy makers make their suspicion of China public and tout the inevitability of a
space war in the very near future. 461
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IV.

Conclusion

During the current tumultuous period of time, the creation of new modes of international order is
inevitable. However, if the previously discussed pattern of separate arrangements devolves into
many spheres of activity, competing world orders could come into existence. Should this be the
case, one goal of coevolution would be to ensure that the United States and China pool efforts
internationally to bring about an agreed world order. In the absence of common goals and agreed
rules of restraint, institutionalized rivalry is likely to escalate beyond the calculation and
intentions of its advocates. In an era in which unprecedented offensive capabilities and intrusive
technologies multiply, the penalties of failure could be drastic and perhaps irrevocable. 462
The evolution of the world order does not necessarily require accommodating China’s rise at the
expense of America’s influence in the Pacific, nor does it necessitate dividing into opposing
power blocks (as was the case during the Cold War). Further, it does not require seeing the U.S.
undermine China’s emergence through economic, social, and military means, and does not
demand friendly cooperation between the U.S. and China. There is room for a competitive
relationship that redefines the world order, while simultaneously preserving the shared core
interests of both parties. 463 Ultimately, the stability of mutual restraint is advantageous to the
U.S. and China, therefore disarming the inherently unstable security dilemma present in SinoU.S. relations should be the primary concern of U.S. space policy.
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The unstable equilibrium of the security dilemma can be dampened by shifting the Nash
equilibrium from defection to cooperation for both players. This can be accomplished by altering
the players’ utility in three ways: first, increase the benefit of mutual cooperation; second,
decrease the benefit gained from a Defect/Cooperate outcome; third, reduce the cost of a
Cooperate/Defect outcome. The security dilemma can also be dampened by making offensive
and defensive postures distinguishable from one another, as well as creating an environment in
which defense has the advantage over offense. These mechanisms operate by altering the
players’ perception of the zero-sum nature of the game, thereby altering their utility of the
Cooperate/Defect and Defect/Cooperate outcomes. Furthermore, revealing and accounting for
cognitive biases allows for a more accurate perception of threat, reducing the probability that a
player will view the other’s actions as harmful and ultimately increase the likelihood of
cooperation.
The weakness of the current space law régime has resulted in multiple efforts to develop a
code of conduct or an arms control agreement for space for the purpose of limiting the
proliferation of debris and protecting the continued use of the domain. However, these efforts
have been held hostage by a China-U.S. strategic stalemate. 464 On one side, China has
demonstrated a heavy reliance on asymmetric anti-satellite warfare (primarily composed of
kinetic direct-ascent and laser ASAT weapons) to supplement their A2/AD strategy in East Asia.
Therefore, they have staunchly rejected any ban on terrestrial based or debris-causing ASAT
weaponry. The PPWT, introduced jointly by Russia and China, failed to garner support from the
United States because it did not limit the use of ground-based weapons, failed to introduce a
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coherent definition of space weapons, and did not include a verification régime. 465 This was seen
by Washington as a blatant attempt to preserve China’s deterrent threat while removing a key
U.S. military advantage. A resolution against “no first placement” of weapons in outer space
further confirmed U.S. fears that the PPWT was aimed at reducing U.S. warfighting capability.
In 2014, the European Union proposed the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities (ICoC), but it failed to gain traction in the U.S. due to concerns that it would constrain
space capabilities, including space-based missile defense interceptors and anti-satellite
weapons. 466 A cornerstone of U.S. policy is the avoidance of policy decisions that would limit
the use of existing ASAT weapons against Chinese space systems during a regional conflict. 467
This is particularly true when taking into consideration that the concepts of space warfighting,
space superiority, and space control are thoroughly integrated with national policy. 468

A. Policy Recommendations
j. The U.S. military must reduce reliance on space.
It is difficult to codify international norms involving space weaponization and free access to
outer space when the two most influential actors have diametrically opposed strategic interests.
China will likely block initiatives that reduce its own ability to utilize debris causing or terrestrial
ASATs, while simultaneously attempting to limit conventional U.S. military advantage by
pursuing a ban on space weapons. The United States, reluctant to block its path to potential space
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dominance, is unlikely to support a definitive ban on space weaponization; yet, it is incentivized
to create international norms that limit the creation of debris in outer space to protect its highvalue space assets. 469 This dynamic is unlikely to change unless China’s space-based ASAT
capability reaches operational maturity, thus reducing its reliance on direct ascent ASATs.
Alternatively, China’s space capabilities may mature to the extent that they are symmetric with
the United States, allowing for a system of implicit mutual restraint to develop.
The U.S. and China are unlikely to come to an agreement until the structural security
dilemma is addressed. To accomplish this, the United States must reduce the benefit that China
gains from the continued development of debris causing anti-satellite weapons through a denial
of gains strategy. The primary U.S. strategy must be to reduce its reliance on space by
substituting terrestrial capabilities for space-based capabilities in its AirSea Battle (ASB)
concept. This will reduce the role of space in the F2T2EA chain and devalue ASATs as a tactical
and operational weapon. When Chinese strategists believe that the tactical value of direct ascent
ASAT weapons are outweighed by the international stigma of their use, the U.S. may be able to
gain traction in banning such weapons. It may be attractive for U.S. policy makers to pursue a
denial of gains strategy by hardening U.S. space assets against attack because it allows for the
continued reliance on space capabilities. However, this is not an economical strategy due to an
unfavorable offense/defense balance. 470
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k. Reducing fear of U.S. space domination (Reduce fear of C/D)
The dual-use of space technologies results in an inability to conduct offense/defense
differentiation, and creates mistrust, misperceptions, and miscalculations that can undermine
political and strategic stability involving the space domain. 471 When offense/defense
differentiation cannot be accomplished, developing acceptable norms of responsible behavior, if
only to reveal benign intentions and ritualize conflict, is preferable to an attempt to identify and
ban specific technologies and capabilities. 472 Therefore, the United States should seek to
introduce a series of top-down TCBMs that codify a space code of conduct, work toward a treaty
that bans the testing and use of destructive methods against space objects, and increase
transparency and trust in U.S. space policy. Collectively, these initiatives could alleviate the fear
of U.S. space domination.
The infrastructure for introducing TCBM to the international community is well established.
The UNCOPUOS is the principal international forum for the development and codification of
laws and principles governing activities in outer space. 473 A set of Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines was endorsed by the UNCOPUOS in 2007; however, this set of guidelines was nonbinding and contained ambiguous language, such as: “avoid intentional destruction and other
harmful activities,” rather than specifically banning debris-causing space weapons. 474 A working
group under the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee set forth guidelines for the long term
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sustainability of space in 2016, but (like the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines) these were
non-binding. 475 The UN General Assembly adopted the non-binding Resolution 69/32 that
advised against the first placement of weapons in space with 126 in favor, 4 against (including
the United States), and 46 abstentions. 476 These measures, introduced through UNCOPUOS and
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) show that space we aponization and debris mitigation
TCBMs have received adequate attention in the United Nations. The United States’ decision to
remain aloof in these forums in the face of the international consensus will damage U.S. prestige,
raise fear of space weaponization, and threaten its space leadership.
The United States should work through the CD to provide an alternative to China and
Russia’s PPWT proposal. This proposal should ban the testing and use of debris-causing ASAT
weapons and include a definition of “debris-causing” that allows for minor satellite breakups.
This would keep space free of massive debris causing incidents in the event of a conflict, while
simultaneously allowing the continued development of counterspace capabilities. No binding
resolution will be established without an agreement between China and the United States, but (as
discussed previously) a misalignment of strategic interests makes that outcome unlikely.
Therefore, the United States must be prepared to make substantial concessions in order to gain
acceptance from China. A variety of concessions may induce Chinese ratification: first, the U.S.
could include a sidecar that bans on-orbit force application technologies in order to assuage fears
that the U.S. intends to expand its global strike capability through the deployment of space
weapons; second, the U.S. could reconsider its position on an ABM prohibition; third, the U.S.
could pursue a bilateral non-first use pledge with China; fourth, the U.S. could open up the ISS
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program to China; and fifth, the U.S. could restructure ITAR regulations to increase interaction
between Chinese and American commercial markets.
In the absence of a formal treaty, the United States must nonetheless continue to work
towards implementing TCBMs that seek to increase transparency, familiarity and clarity of
intentions, and provide a basis for strengthening mutual trust building and confidence amongst
states. 477 Improving space situational awareness (SSA) through an international outreach effort is
the ideal platform through which to accomplish these goals. SSA is vital to the long-term
sustainability of the space environment because it helps mitigate natural environmental threats
and identifies behavior that would be detrimental to responsible use and long-term
sustainability. 478 Therefore, SSA will be a foundational verification mechanism for potential
treaties as well as an opportunity for cooperative trust building. 479 SSA is generally made up of
two components: space surveillance and tracking (SST) and space traffic management (STM).
First, SST involves using ground-based and space-based optical sensors and radars in order to
track, characterize, and analyze space objects. Second, STM utilizes SST data in order to ensure
safe passage through the space environment. 480 Both SST and STM require cooperative efforts to
be successful. SST necessitates a diverse, geographically dispersed sensor network to provide
timely, accurate data on objects in a wide array of orbits. 481 A single nation is not able to provide
the geographical coverage needed for a comprehensive SST network. STM requires agreed upon
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standards of behavior to ensure spaceflight safety. 482 There is currently no standardized regime
for conducting the broad SSA mission in order to analyze and communicate threats to the space
domain. 483 This creates an opportunity for the U.S. to utilize its position of technical superiority
in order to score a soft power coup by taking the lead in a global SSA initiative.
The major obstacle to building an international SSA coalition is the military utility SST data,
which can be used to reveal classified military capabilities and conduct ASAT targeting. 484 The
United States possesses the most comprehensive network of SST sensors and maintains a
database of 20,000+ space objects. 485 However, the U.S. military did not share this data until an
Iridium satellite collided with a Russian military satellite, prompting the amendment of 10
U.S.C. § 2274 to authorize the provision of SSA services if they were consistent with national
security interests. 486 After this event, the U.S. Strategic Command’s SSA sharing program grew
exponentially, providing close approach notices to satellite owner operators and freely sharing
SST data on its website. 487 This was a good first step, but an increase in the quantity of SST
sensors in the past decade has done little to bolster space traffic management efforts due to the
disjointed nature of the data. 488 As the space community attempts to consolidate SST data as part
of a broader SSA régime, multiple nascent SST data sharing organizations show that a U.S.
centric model is not guaranteed. 489 The U.S. could put itself in a dangerous situation if it
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attempts to control SST data for the purposes of military use; this could potentially result in
having complete control over only a fraction of the SST market, while American commercial
SST companies lose their competitive edge. 490
In order to leverage the proliferation of SST sensors, increased interest in orbital debris
mitigation from the international community, and the extant U.S. technological advantage in
SST, the U.S. needs to encourage a U.S. centric data sharing model. The first step in this process
will be separating the SSA mission from its military origins. Space Policy Directive-3, National
Space Traffic Management Policy, issued by President Trump on June 18, 2018, indicates that
the White House intends to act in that manner. The space policy directive orders the U.S.
government to do the following: pioneer new SST technologies, encourage the commercial SST
market, create SST data interoperability, develop STM standards and best practices, improve
U.S. domestic space object registry, and encourage SST data sharing. All this will be
accomplished primarily by the Department of Commerce, reducing the role of the DoD in the
SSA mission. 491 SPD-3 is absolutely in line with the recommendations of this thesis.
While the United States is attempting to build bridges in the international space community,
it may be burning others at an equivalent rate. In order to reduce Chinese fear of U.S. space
domination, American decision makers must be careful to avoid inflammatory and militaristic
rhetoric. The groundwork for space warfighting was set by the George W. Bush administration
on the heels of the Rumsfeld Commission’s “Space Pearl Harbor” warning. The 2006 U.S.
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National Space Policy maintained the right to deny adversaries use of space if those capabilities
are hostile to U.S. national interests. 492 Note that the policy does not say “deny adversaries use
of space if those capabilities are hostile to U.S. space assets,” which would infer a natural right to
self-defense. Rather, the language of the space policy suggests that the U.S. has the right to
interdict an adversary’s space capabilities if they provide space effects that are disadvantageous
to national security. This is consistent with the militaristic vernacular in the United States Space
Command Vision for 2020, which promises to provide full spectrum space dominance hinging on
space control capabilities. The Vision for 2020 compares space to other warfighting domains
(land, air, and sea) and asserts that during the early 21st century, space power will evolve into a
separate and equal medium of warfare. 493 This rhetoric, combined with technological
developments during the Bush administration, made the prospect of U.S. space domination seem
incipient to Chinese policy makers and reignited conversation about space weaponization. 494
The Obama Administration brought more moderate rhetoric by excluding inflammatory
language in the 2010 National Space policy, recommending space arms control, suggesting
TCBMs for space stability, as well as allowing Bush era technology programs expire. 495 This
policy was received very well in Asia, allowing the Obama administration to open high level
strategic dialog about space cooperation with China and strengthen relations with East Asian
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allies. 496 However, inflammatory and militaristic rhetoric returned with the Trump
administration. Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson and other top Air Force leaders
resurrected the idea of space as a warfighting domain during testimony to Congress, saying that
the Air Force needed to maintain its capability regardless of consensus on international norms. 497
In 2017 Air Force Space Command created the National Space Defense Center to integrate space
capabilities and C2 methods in order to help conduct a space war. 498 President Trump echoed
that space is a war-fighting domain by signing the Space Policy Directive-4 on 19 February
2019, which proposes the creation of a Space Force as the sixth branch of service. 499 These
reorganizations alone are not as inherently threatening or substantive as the weapons
development programs pioneered during the early 2000s. However, the incendiary rhetoric that
accompanied these reorganizations may have counteracted the potentially powerful TCBMs
outlined in SPD 2-3. The White House should emphasize cooperative, collaborative space
initiatives as part of future space policy directives, rather than set a course for unilateralist
(America First) action.
l. Pursue active cooperation. (Increase benefit of CC)
The U.S. space community must pursue active cooperation with China in order to increase
the potential benefit of a Cooperate/Cooperate outcome. Robust bilateral cooperation between
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the U.S. and China could increase trust and transparency, as well as improve signaling by
engendering repeated diplomatic and scientific interaction, increase interdependence by giving
each country a stake in the success of the other’s space program, foster China’s interest in space
sustainability, and give China and the United States insight into each other’s space program. 500
China could benefit by learning from a more technologically advanced partner, while the United
States learns about the capabilities and organization of a traditionally opaque bureaucracy. 501
Collaboration may also have significant cost sharing benefits, especially considering that the ISS
may be reaching end of life and funding is precarious. 502 Additionally, active engagement with
China on manned space exploration and deep space science may prevent the development of a
China-led space station, which could solidify its diplomatic ties within Europe and East Asia. 503
For these reasons, increased cooperation with China has the potential to yield great results;
however, U.S. decision makers must take care to avoid pitfalls of past space cooperation projects
when crafting Sino-U.S. policy. 504
China has showed an openness to bilateral cooperation, particularly between NASA and the
China National Space Administration (CNSA) regarding manned space exploration and space
science. 505 In 2006, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin and other top NASA officials toured
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Chinese space facilities in a landmark visit on the invitation of Laiyan Sun, administrator of the
CNSA. 506 This event was followed shortly after by a second visit by NASA administrator
Charles Bolden (Griffin’s successor) in 2010. 507 Additionally, in October 2010, Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates and China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie emphasized the need for
dialog about space security and bilateral TCBMs. 508 This high level engagement could have
marked a significant breakthrough in Sino-U.S. space relations, and been preceded by lowerlevel technical discussions, had the U.S. Congress not passed Public Law 112-55, Sec. 539 in
2011, which banned NASA from engaging in bilateral agreements and coordination with
China. 509 Current NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine and CNSA administrator Zhang Kejian
discussed SSA and deep space exploration as potential areas of cooperation in 2018, but this was
not followed up by technical discussion. 510
In order to foster cooperation between China and the United States, domestic reforms need to
be made. First, NASA should be the focal point for Sino-U.S. space cooperation: Public Law
112-55, Sec. 539 should immediately be repealed to allow for NASA-CNSA engagement.
Likewise, long-awaited domestic export control reforms would need to take place in order to
streamline scientific and technical exchange and prevent further legal barriers to cooperation. 511
Additionally, the U.S. must be prepared to make a long-term commitment to China-U.S. joint
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projects to assuage the fear of American political volatility. 512 After these steps have been
accomplished, the U.S. should clarify that joint NASA-CNSA projects will only take place for
programs that have been removed from military control. 513 The delineation between military and
civilian control may address U.S. domestic concerns about technology transfer and set a
groundwork for civilian control of space programs in China, potentially weakening the security
dilemma by alleviating part of the dual-use conundrum.

B. Summary
The confluence of current Sino-U.S. relations and the state of space technology creates a
structural security dilemma: the United States is excessively reliant on space support to conduct
military operations in East Asia, which incentivizes China to pursue the development of
technological and tactical innovations to deprive the U.S. of its operational advantage. This
development threatens the U.S.’s conventional deterrent threat in the region, undermining
strategic relations with key East Asian allies. The U.S. lacks a symmetrical response to China’s
ASAT threat and must develop other means of deterrence, increasing the likelihood of horizontal
escalation. Simultaneously, the offense-dominance of the space domain results in the lack of
first-strike stability. These factors increase the likelihood that space will serve as a flash-point for
a regional conflict in East Asia, and attempts to mitigate this threat are unlikely to succeed due to
the inherent dual-use of most space technologies. Cognitive biases further worsen this security
dilemma. Furthermore, China’s historic “century of humiliation” and rising technonationalism
explain its position of losses seeking gains, making Chinese decision makers more likely to take
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over-weighted risk in order to overturn the existing status quo. Key cultural differences
proliferate conflict between the U.S. and China, further altering leaders’ decision calculus and
creating an opportunity for self-fulfilling prophesy. Despite this grim prescription, arms race and
conflict between the two nations is not inevitable. The implementation of top-down TCBMs
designed to build trust and transparency can direct both nations towards a globally optimal
outcome.

C. Further Research
This analysis is by no means exhaustive. In some cases, dozens of peer reviewed sources
were boiled down to a sentence or two for the sake of brevity and conciseness. For example, the
interaction of space law and this international relations focused analysis was only examined at a
surface level. In many cases, sweeping generalizations replaced the minutia on which a legal
analysis often hinges. As a result, this analysis is more effective for understanding the structural
dynamic of Sino-U.S. space policy, than it is presenting detailed proposals and recommendations
that a space lawyer would consider actionable. However, it does explain why current proposals
for changing the space law régime have failed to gain consensus from China, Russia, and the
United States. Future research should incorporate the “lessons learned” from this analysis in an
attempt to develop a space code of conduct that can garner the agreement of the major
spacefaring powers.
Also, it is clear from this analysis that establishing a threshold in order to distinguish between
chicken and the security dilemma is vital to avoid uncontrollable escalation. Future research
must attempt to establish a clearly defined escalation ladder for space warfighting. It must also
find methods to conduct strategic messaging between the U.S. and China so that these new rules
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of the game can be ritualized. In order to do this, the game theoretical framework must expand to
account for a sequential game.
Furthermore, it should be notable that two very important events were mentioned only
superficially in this analysis; the U.S. withdrawal from the INF treaty and India’s ASAT
demonstration, which both occurred in early 2019. An examination of the treaty withdrawal
would be a natural topic for further research, because it has the potential to significantly upset
the current strategic status quo; leading to increased regional tension, a realignment of strategic
posture, the proliferation of nuclear material, and creating an opportunity for strategic
miscalculation. These factors are fundamental to this analysis; therefore, an inevitable influx of
new information will necessitate a reexamination of this topic within a very short time. Luckily,
the current framework is adequate to account for this development. On the other hand, the Indian
ASAT demonstration is a milestone event in the space law and policy world that will require an
expansion in the scope of this analysis. The ASAT demonstration raises questions about the
proliferation of ASAT technology and the rise of India as a major regional competitor. In order
to account for this, the game theoretical framework would need to expand to include India,
Japan, Russia, and possibly Europe as players. This expansion adds considerable computational
complexity and ultimately uncertainty.
As a parting statement: India’s ASAT test and the withdrawal from the INF treaty are
indicative of a major strategic upheaval; an increasingly multi-polar world and strategic
rebalance is coming faster than many anticipate. Rapid technological advances in spacelift,
computing, and man-machine integration will impact the space domain in unpredictable ways.
China remains opaque, but it is impossible to avoid the sense that Xi Jinping’s rise to power is
the most significant event in China since Mao’s death. The complete collapse of the Chinese
146

economy and social structure, leading to global recession; a rapid Chinese expansion leading to
regional conflict; a slow, peaceful Chinese usurpation of the U.S. led world order; or continued
competitive, but peaceful coexistence between the U.S. and China are all equally likely
outcomes. These trends were completely obvious with the benefit of hindsight, but what they
mean for the future remains unclear.
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